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 Conventional warfare between India and Pakistan could inadvertently escalate to 
nuclear warfare.  Asymmetries in military doctrine and capability undermine deterrence 
stability and could lead to the use of nuclear weapons if the two nations become engaged 
in a large-scale conventional conflict.  This is a grave situation given the history of 
conflict and the ongoing India-Pakistan standoff over the divided state of Kashmir. 
 Following the 1998 nuclear weapons tests, the 1999 Kargil Conflict played out 
under the nuclear umbrella.  This conflict remained very limited, leading to the 
expectation that future conflicts will follow the same pattern.  However, there is a 
growing gap in conventional military capabilities, and growing pressure in India to 
retaliate against Pakistan for its alleged support of terrorism and insurgency.  India has 
invested heavily in force modernization, potentially changing the scope of conventional 
military operations and making more likely Pakistan’s intentional use of nuclear weapons 
triggered by India unintentionally crossing the “red-line.” 
 This thesis examines the possibility of inadvertent nuclear escalation between 
India and Pakistan.  It analyzes the deterrence system that is evolving in South Asia, and 
describes the conditions under which the system could fail.  It describes the effect that 
conventional force modernization could have on small nuclear arsenals.  Large-scale 
conventional war could threaten the survival of strategic nuclear forces, particularly those 
of Pakistan.  Conventional war also could damage vital strategic command and control 
functions.  Finally, India’s growing conventional military power may cause Pakistan to 
adopt a launch-on-warning posture where any air or ballistic missile attack could be 
interpreted as the beginning of a pre-emptive attack.  Any of these situations could lead to 
inadvertent nuclear escalation.  This thesis concludes by recommending steps that the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Can India and Pakistan fight a conventional war and avoid the use of nuclear 
weapons?  India and Pakistan have had contentious relations since each state gained 
independence in 1947.  This has led to three wars and numerous skirmishes.  Both India 
and Pakistan declared that they were nuclear weapon states following a series of nuclear 
weapons detonations in May 1998.  The addition of nuclear arsenals to this enduring 
rivalry raises the stakes, not just for India and Pakistan, but also for the rest of the world.  
This thesis explores the circumstances that could cause conventional warfare between 
India and Pakistan to escalate inadvertently to nuclear warfare.   
Barry Posen, an award winning author and currently a professor of political 
science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, developed the framework that I use to 
examine the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war between India and Pakistan.  Posen 
identified three possible causes of nuclear escalation that are applicable to India and 
Pakistan.  First, conventional attacks could come into direct contact with the adversary’s 
nuclear forces and threaten the survivability of those forces.  Second, conventional 
attacks could degrade the adversary’s use of nuclear forces in the time, place, and method 
of choosing, forcing major changes in its war-fighting strategy, especially if there is a 
loss of control in the strategic command and control infrastructure. Third, a conventional 
attack could be mistaken as a pre-emptive strike to destroy or neutralize strategic assets 
and possibly cause the attacked state to launch its strategic nuclear forces at the first sign 
of an attack.  Any of these scenarios could lead to what Posen calls “inadvertent nuclear 
escalation.”1  This thesis also follows this sequence, based on how likely these events 
could lead to inadvertent nuclear war between India and Pakistan. 
This thesis analyzes these three conditions in the context of the strategic 
relationship between India and Pakistan.  I use deterrence theory, force posture and 
doctrine, and the lessons learned from previous conflicts as guides in this analysis.  
Neither state wants a nuclear war; an intentional nuclear war is very unlikely.  I argue 
                                                 
1 Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 2. 
2 
that there is a much greater risk of unintentional nuclear war due to the interplay of 
conventional and strategic forces in an asymmetric environment, characterized by India’s 
superior conventional military power and Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth.  Steps to 
stabilize the region and limit the possibility of a crisis escalating to nuclear war must be 
undertaken.  The United States can, and should, play a major role in stabilizing the region 
due to its close ties with both states. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
Any war fought by nuclear-armed states has the potential to escalate to nuclear 
use.  The use of force entails some degree of risk and potential loss of control and 
escalation.  Predicting how the opponent will react and what impact that it will have on 
the conflict is part of the cost-benefit analysis.  Understanding how deterrence operates is 
relevant to understanding the potential for escalation in South Asia.  I examine how 
deterrence operates under ideal circumstances.  This will be followed by an examination 
of inadvertent escalation theory, or how deterrence may fail to work in three real world 
conditions. 
 
1. Deterrence Theory and Stability 
How does deterrence work under ideal conditions?  Generally, successful 
deterrence requires three components: capability, communication, and credibility.  First, 
the party fearing attack must have the capability to use nuclear weapons, or any other 
type of “punishing force” against an aggressor.  Second, the threat of retaliation must be 
clearly communicated to the potential aggressor by a reliable, authorized source.  Third, 
the potential aggressor must understand that the first two elements exist and are credible, 
that is, a willingness to carry through with the threat exists.2  
The first component of successful deterrence is capability.  This requires the 
capability to punish the adversary to such a degree that this adversary is unwilling to risk 
further provocation.  Deterrence optimists, such as Kenneth Waltz, argue that this 
                                                 
2 Mario E. Carranza, “An Impossible Game: Stable Nuclear Deterrence After the Indian and Pakistani 
Tests,” The Nonproliferation Review (spring/summer 1989), 16. 
3 
condition has been facilitated by the addition of nuclear weapons into the arsenals of 
various states.3  They point to the lack of war between nuclear powers as proof of this 
concept.  This concept attracted many supporters during the Cold War, and many came to 
believe that the mission of the military in the nuclear age had changed from winning 
wars, to preventing wars.4  However, nuclear weapon states have been involved in wars 
with non-nuclear weapons states, and limited conflicts have been fought between nuclear 
powers. 
 Communication of the threat is the second component of deterrence.  This threat 
must be made by a reliable or authorized source.  For deterrence to work it is especially 
important “to communicate… capability and resolve to adversaries.”5  Signaling must be 
made in a clear manner that is understandable to the adversary.  There can be significant 
problems with communicating a threat intended to deter an adversary.  The threat can be 
lost in a crisis situation due to competing signals and information overload, or because 
the threat is conveyed in an unexpected manner that the adversary cannot pick up on.6  
The final component of deterrence is that the adversary must believe that the 
threat is real, that is, there is a willingness to carry through with the threatened action.  
This means that for nuclear deterrence to succeed, the adversary must believe that nuclear 
weapons will be used if it continues with its actions.  This is the most complex of the 
three components.  It is based upon the existence of the first two components, capability 
and a communicated threat, and the belief that retaliation is probable.  A nuclear response 
must appear to be credible, not a bluff.7  This may be the most difficult of the three 
components of nuclear deterrence to establish.  Nuclear weapons have not been used in 
combat since the end of the Second World War.  The intervening half-century of history 
has led many to believe that nuclear weapons only deter the use of nuclear weapons. 
                                                 
3 See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1995). 
4 Bernard Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and 
World Order, ed. Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1946), 76.  
5 Richard Ned Lebow, “Conclusions,” in Psychology and Deterrence, ed. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned 
Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1985), 205. 
6 Ibid, 205-211. 
7 David W. Tarr, Nuclear Deterrence and International Security: Alternative Nuclear Regimes (New 
York, Longman, 1991), 68-69. 
4 
Establishing deterrence is critical.  However, once established the general goal is 
to maintain it over time.  Stable nuclear deterrence is obtained when the following four 
requirements are met.  All of these requirements can be considered as part of the 
capability portion of deterrence.  First, the nuclear weapons must be technically reliable; 
that is, they must have a proven performance.  Second, both sides must develop a secure 
second-strike capability, that is, strategic forces must be able to survive an attack and 
retaliate against the aggressor.  Third, neither side can believe that it can destroy the 
opponent’s nuclear capability in a pre-emptive attack.  Finally, the nuclear forces must be 
secure against unauthorized or accidental use.8  India and Pakistan met the first 
requirement in May 1998; the other three requirements have not been fully met, as will be 
demonstrated below.   
Finally, a key component of a stable nuclear deterrence is crisis stability, which 
has been defined as “a measure of a country’s incentives not to pre-empt in a crisis.”9  
This involves a cost-benefit analysis of whether a first-strike will succeed and 
incapacitate the opponent’s second-strike nuclear capability.  Small strategic arsenals, 
such as those of India and Pakistan, may provide an incentive for an opponent to pre-
empt.  Such a threat, if credible, or assumed to be credible, could undermine confidence 
that sufficient strategic forces would survive, and therefore undermine deterrence 
stability.  The advent of precision-guided munitions in South Asia combined with the 
increased technical sophistication of intelligence gathering and targeting assets, may 
allow small nuclear arsenals to be severely damaged, if not completely destroyed, by 
conventional forces.10 
The United States and the Soviet Union met the four requirements for stable 
nuclear deterrence and achieved crisis stability.  Both conventional and nuclear war was 
                                                 
8 Carranza, “An Impossible Game,” 16. 
9 James J. Wirtz, “Beyond Bipolarity: Prospects for Nuclear Stability after the Cold War,” in The 
Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order, ed. T.V. Paul, Richard J. 
Harknett, and James J. Wirtz (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 142. 
10 The U.S. 2001 Nuclear Posture Review recognizes that a new triad exists, with conventional 
munitions assuming a major role in the new deterrence posture.  U.S. Department of Defense, Findings of 
the United States Nuclear Posture Review, 9 January 2002, at 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/g020109-D-6570C.html>; Donald H. Rumsfield, Nuclear 
Posture Review Foreward, 9 January 2002, at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/d20020109npr.pdfd>; and J.D. Crouch, Briefing on the Nuclear 
Posture Review, 9 January 2002, at <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/review.htm>.  
5 
avoided partly as a result of this.  Hundreds of nuclear weapons tests were conducted, 
proving the technical capability of both arsenals to do tremendous damage, if not destroy 
the world.  The United States and the Soviet Union developed nuclear triads made up of 
an air component, land-based missiles, and submarine-based missiles to ensure 
survivability, thus meeting the second requirement.  Both sides attempted to develop a 
pre-emptive or decapitating first-strike capability, however, the robustness of the triad 
coupled with the inability to destroy sufficient numbers of the opponent’s incoming 
warheads if the first-strike failed put that possibility to rest, thereby meeting the third 
requirement.  Both the United States and Soviet Union developed robust command and 
control systems and technically sophisticated nuclear weapons featuring advanced 
negative controls to guard against unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons. 
Many knowledgeable observers fear that new nuclear states will not be able to 
develop a stable deterrence capability.  This is the crux of the proliferation pessimist 
argument, as advanced by Scott Sagan.11  Posen surmised, “these countries are unlikely 
to deploy nuclear weapons in ways that enhance stability” due to the inability to provide 
survivable retaliatory forces in “numbers, basing modes, or early warning capabilities.”12  
These warnings ring more true today.  The tremendous efforts made by the United States 
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War to build secure second-strike capabilities, 
robust command and control capabilities, and effective early warning systems have not 
been matched by India and Pakistan.  This leads to greater instability and increases the 
risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation.  Additionally, as Posen hypothesized, conventional 
forces may pose a threat to strategic forces.  This is especially true in the case of India 
and Pakistan, which have sought to develop a minimum deterrence capability at a much 
lower cost, compared to the superpowers. 
 
2. Inadvertent Escalation 
What is escalation?  Is there a difference between deliberate escalation and 
inadvertent escalation?  These questions were asked during the Cold War, and some 
                                                 
11 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; A Debate. 
12 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 200. 
6 
understanding was reached that can help us in the context of a crisis in South Asia.  
Escalation of any kind is due to deterrence failing. 
Escalation has been described as a process of increasing efforts in some way in 
the hope of gaining success, especially if the other side does not undermine this effort by 
responding in kind.13  Escalation is when “a would be escalator can increase, or threaten 
to increase his efforts: by increasing intensity, widening the area, or compounding 
escalation.”14  Herman Kahn outlined a process of escalation involving 44 rungs that 
ranged from a limited crisis to full-scale thermonuclear war.  This initial concept of 
escalation as developed during the Cold War came to mean to expand or spiral upward.  
The most widely understood threshold in modern warfare is the distinction between the 
use of conventional and nuclear weapons.15   
The decision to escalate is “a strategic issue, involving…difficult and often 
painfully uncertain calculation of the possibility of counter escalation by the enemy.”16  
The decision to escalate is a cost-benefit analysis to expand or increase efforts in the 
hopes to gain success or win, and could include nuclear escalation.  This is in stark 
contrast to Posen’s description of inadvertent escalation, where crossing the nuclear 
threshold is accidental and due to the unexpected results of conventional attacks.  These 
escalation producing conventional attacks could take a number of forms, but the 
following three are the most likely, and will be used in this thesis.  First, conventional 
attacks could affect the survivability of the adversary’s strategic arsenal.  Secondly, 
conventional attacks could degrade the strategic command and control of the adversary’s 
nuclear forces. Finally, conventional attacks could be mistaken for a pre-emptive first-
strike and start a nuclear alert cycle and cause a launch on warning.   
The difference between deliberate escalation and inadvertent escalation may be 
easiest to illustrate by using a well-known case study.  During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
                                                 
13 Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 
3. 
14 Ibid, 4. 
15 For a more detailed explanation of escalation see Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 19–23; Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear 
Option  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 103-112; and Herman Kahn, On Escalation: 
Metaphors and Scenarios, 94. 
16 Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation, 4. 
7 
1962, and after intense deliberation by the senior leadership, the United States announced 
a quarantine of Cuba.  The armed forces of the United States, including the nuclear 
forces, were put on full alert.  This was a deliberate escalation on the part of the United 
States, and served as a profound warning to the Soviet Union of the seriousness of the 
situation.   
At the same time that these deliberate actions were taking place, a series of 
unattended events transpired.  A U2 reconnaissance over-flight of the Soviet Union 
proceeded as scheduled, as well as a missile launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base.  
These incidents could have been mistaken as a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, and 
prompted the Soviets to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike against the United States.  A 
U2 was shot down over Cuba on 27 October, and U.S. tactical aircraft were prepared to 
attack the Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in Cuba.  The results of such an 
attack could have been disastrous, putting conventional systems in direct contact with 
nuclear systems, and threatening the survival of the Soviet nuclear-armed missiles.  U.S. 
intelligence thought that the Soviet missiles were operational, and that there were nuclear 
weapons somewhere in Cuba.  The nuclear warheads themselves had arrived in Cuba on 
4 October.  Post-crisis imagery analysis showed that some warheads had been mated to 
the missiles when the crisis reached its peak.  Individual missile battery commanders had 
the ability to launch the nuclear-armed missiles since there were no negative control 
features on early Soviet missiles and nuclear weapons.17  How close the world really 
came to nuclear warfare was fully appreciated only when classified documents were 
released following the end of the Cold War. 
Posen analyzed how conventional military operations between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact could have escalated into nuclear war in Inadvertent Escalation.  He 
defined inadvertent escalation as conventional warfare that accidentally rises to nuclear 
warfare. This is in direct contrast to deliberate escalation, where the potential for nuclear 
                                                 
17 How close the world came to inadvertent nuclear escalation during the Cuban Missile Crisis has 
been revealed only since the end of the Cold War allowed a full discussion from all perspectives.  For a 
thorough discussion of the operational readiness of Soviet missiles during the Cuban missile crisis see Dino 
A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 
1990), 452-463 and 538-548; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Niftal, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, 
Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997), 217; and CIA 
Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, ed. Mary S. McAuliffe, CIA History Staff (Washington, 
D.C.: CIA, 1992), a collection of declassified documents pertaining to the subject. 
8 
warfare is either accepted as a risk, or deliberate steps are taken to use nuclear weapons.  
The analysis of the current situation in South Asia requires a comparison of conventional 
forces, strategic forces, and nuclear doctrine to assess whether similar conditions exist 
today on the subcontinent. 
 
C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis examines the potential for conventional conflict between India and 
Pakistan to inadvertently escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.  Conventional warfare 
could theoretically lead to nuclear escalation under certain conditions.  Understanding 
those conditions could provide a basis for limiting any conventional conflict between 
India and Pakistan to ensure that those conditions are not met.  The forces that bear on 
this situation include conventional forces and doctrine, strategic nuclear forces and 
doctrine, and possible interaction between the conventional and strategic systems that 
could lead to inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. 
This thesis has six chapters.  Chapter I introduces the theoretical aspects of 
deterrence and inadvertent escalation.  Chapter II analyzes the conventional and strategic 
balance in South Asia.  Chapter III presents a case study of how the survivability of the 
strategic nuclear weapons systems could be threatened, potentially leading to inadvertent 
nuclear escalation.  Chapter IV consists of a case study on the potential for the loss of 
command and control of strategic forces in South Asia, thereby leading to nuclear 
escalation.  Chapter V outlines the risks that advanced offensive and defensive 
conventional weapons present to India and Pakistan’s small strategic arsenals, potentially 
causing any conventional attack to be mistaken for pre-emption of the strategic systems, 
and causing a launch-on-warning.  Chapter VI concludes with a findings, implications, 
and recommendations for U.S. policy. 
9 
II. COMPARISON OF FORCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The study of the potential for inadvertent nuclear escalation in South Asia must be 
based on an assessment of the conventional military and strategic nuclear forces that 
could play a role in a military conflict.  This chapter analyzes the conventional and 
strategic balance in South Asia, with a focus on those forces that could be employed in a 
conflict.  This chapter describes the military asymmetries that currently exist in South 
Asia.  It begins by comparing conventional military forces, focusing on ground and air 
forces, and includes the doctrinal roles of these forces.  Strategic forces are then 
compared, including both nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.  Finally, India and 
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines are compared.   
These comparisons yield important results. India has achieved numerical and 
qualitative superiority in many categories, particularly in mechanized ground forces and 
in attack aircraft.  India is also improving its military forces at a rate that Pakistan cannot 
match due to a lack of resources.  Both India and Pakistan have relatively small nuclear 
arsenals.  Pakistan is continuing to fall behind in aircraft quality and quantity, and has put 
a much greater emphasis on ballistic missiles as nuclear delivery systems.  India had the 
initial lead in missile technology, but failed to follow through and lost its advantage.  
India enjoys a tremendous advantage in both quantity and quality of nuclear capable 
aircraft, and is currently putting more emphasis on its missile program.  This asymmetry 
of military means is reinforced by the asymmetry of methods, especially in nuclear 
doctrine.  Pakistan has attempted to offset India’s conventional advantage by building a 
nuclear deterrent, including a first-use option, while India has a retaliatory doctrine and 
nuclear forces that are primarily designed to deter nuclear attack.  These factors have a 
tremendous influence on the potential for inadvertent escalation.  
 
B. COMPARING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 
The conventional military balance in South Asia is in India’s favor.  It is the 
larger of the two countries in territory, population, and in economic capacity.  This gives 
10 
India an advantage that Pakistan has attempted to address throughout its history in 
different ways.  Pakistan was able to maintain a qualitative superiority in conventional 
arms until the 1970s.  Pakistan lost U.S. support and India aligned itself with the Soviet 
Union during the 1970s.  India was able to close the qualitative gap with Pakistan due to 
the combination of Soviet assistance and greater economic resources.  A cursory 
examination shows that India has a greater number of personnel on active military duty, 
more tanks, and more combat aircraft.18  A thorough discussion of conventional forces is 
provided.  These forces are grouped into ground and air components for the sake of 
clarity. 
 
1. Ground Forces and Role 
India’s army is the largest and most prestigious of India’s services and consists of 
1,100,000 active duty personnel (see Table 1).  The Indian army is a highly trained and 
highly professional service.  The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) is the senior Army leader, 
and Army headquarters are located in New Delhi.  The Indian Army consists of five 
major regional commands and a training command.  The bulk of the armored and 
mechanized forces are part of Western Command and are adjacent to the Pakistan border.  
The army is based upon a corps model (twelve corps currently) for tactical control.  India 
has four premier Reinforced Army Plains Infantry Divisions (RAPID), made up of mixed 
armor and mechanized infantry units, and 3 armor divisions, 18 infantry divisions, and 9 
mountain divisions.19     
India has many fairly modern tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and other weapon 
systems.  These include T-72 and T-90 tanks and BMP-1 and BMP-2 infantry fighting 
vehicles and equivalent indigenously produced weapons.  India also has a large artillery 
force, primarily consisting of towed howitzers.   There are insufficient quantities of self-
                                                 
18 “Executive Summary, Pakistan” in Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment South Asia, no. 10 (3 
September 2002), 5, at <http://online.janes.com/>; Anthony H. Cordesman, The Conventional Military 
Balance in India Pakistan and South Asia: A Comparative Summary of Military Expenditures; Manpower; 
Land; Air; and Naval Forces; and Arms Sales (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 27 December 
2001), 6-7; and Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001), 47-48. 
19 “Army, India,” in Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment South Asia, no. 10 (31 May 2002), 1-7, at 
<http://online.janes.com/>; and Cordesman, The Conventional Military Balance, 9-11. 
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propelled howitzers to support the armored and mechanized forces, and there is a new 
requirement for 600 howitzers.  A mixture of low to high-level SAM and air defense 
artillery provide a fairly good air defense.  The bulk of the Indian Army consists of light 
infantry armed with small arms and mortars and supported by towed artillery.  Many of 
these units are deployed in the mountainous regions bordering Pakistan and China, which 
requires a commitment of nine infantry divisions.20 
India has developed an offensive-defensive military doctrine that calls for 
aggressive offensive action to pre-empt or counter-attack the enemy, thereby gaining the 
initiative.  Currently, India is exploring the concept of limited conventional war based on 
the concept of strategic space between low-intensity, or proxy conflicts such as Kashmir, 
and full-scale conventional war.  This concept is fueled by political and public pressure 
within India to launch a conventional attack on Pakistan in retaliation for Pakistan’s 
alleged support of terrorism.21  A limited attack is designed to overcome the stability-
instability paradox, or the use of nuclear deterrence to support conventional aggression.22  
India is very much aware of Pakistan’s military and geographic weaknesses, and has 
concentrated most of its conventional military power where it can threaten to cut Pakistan 
in two and defeat the Pakistan Army using a mechanized thrust by the strike corps.  The 
Indian Army mounted a major counter-offensive towards Lahore during the 1965 War 
while attacking simultaneously in the Sialkot region that nearly succeeded in 
accomplishing exactly that.  Chapter Three will explore these concepts further.  
The Pakistani Army is also highly professional, well trained, and enjoys a great 
deal of status within Pakistan, although this reputation has been tarnished in recent 
months due to President Musharraf’s manipulation of the Pakistani political process and 
the Army’s continuing role in government.  The COAS is the senior military leader.  
Army headquarters are located in Rawalpindi.  Force structure is comprised of nine 
corps; the most important are the two strike corps and three corps defending the border 
                                                 
20 Ibid; and “New Indian 155 mm Self-Propelled Artillery System,” in Jane’s Armour and Artillery, 
no. 22, ed. Christopher F. Foss (Coulson, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 2002) 123-124. 
21 Guarav Kampani, “Placing the Indo-Pakistani Standoff in Perspective,” at CNS Web Reports, 8 
April 2002, 14-15, at <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/indopak.pdf>.    
22 V.R. Raghavan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” The Proliferation Review 
(fall/winter 2001), 83. 
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with India.  The army’s total strength is 550,000 personnel on active duty, organized into 
19 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, and 7 independent armored brigades (see 
Table 1).23    
Pakistan’s armor forces consists of U.S., Soviet-type, and Chinese manufactured 
tanks and infantry vehicles, with no true infantry fighting vehicles.  Much of this 
equipment is obsolete, though well maintained.  Pakistan’s best tanks are the Ukrainian 
T-80 and the older U.S. M48A5.  Pakistan’s artillery is a mixture of U.S. and Soviet 
cannons, mostly towed.  Sufficient self-propelled howitzers are available to support the 
premier armor and mechanized units.  Pakistani air defense relies upon large quantities of 
man-portable SAMs and light air-defense cannons.  The bulk of Pakistan’s army consists 
of light infantry similar to that of India, and is armed in a similar manner.  The utility of 
light forces on the mechanized battlefield is probably limited, but they can perform 
admirably in more constrained terrain.  Another potential weakness is the poor 
coordination of air support between the Army and the Air Force.24 
Pakistan has been unable to keep pace with India’s conventional military growth.  
A major obstacle is simply expense, even though Pakistan spends at double the GDP rate 
of India (averaging about six percent per year compared to about three percent).   
Pakistan’s defense expenditures were less than U.S. $4 billion in 2000, compared to 
India’s defense expenditures of about U.S. $18 billion.   The Army gets the biggest share 
of Pakistan’s military budget, although a growing percentage has been spent on strategic 
systems rather than on ground forces.25   
The Pakistani army relies upon the offensive-defensive strategy, which is 
characterized by retaining adequate reserves at successive force levels, surprise, and 
aggressive leadership.  This strategy, originally devised by General Aslam Beg and first 
tested during the 1989 Zarb-e-Momin exercises, calls for the Pakistan Army to discern 
                                                 
23 “Army, Pakistan,” in Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, South Asia, no. 10 (31 May 2002), 1–5, 
at <http://online.janes.com/>; and Cordesman, The Conventional Military Balance, 9-11. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Rodney W. Jones, Force Modernization Trends-India and Pakistan (Policy Architects International, 
23-25 October 2001) 10-12, at <http://www.policyarchitects.org/pdf/ForceModern_IndiaPakistan2.pdf>; 
and Rodney W. Jones, Military Asymmetry and Instability in Emerging Nuclear States: India and Pakistan 
(Policy Architects International, March 2002), at 
<http://www.policyarchitects.org/pdf/NucStability_IndiaPakistan1.pdf>. 
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the initial enemy thrust, take effective counter measures to limit penetration, and 
simultaneously attack the adversary to capture/threaten a strategic objective.26  However, 
the two wars (1965 and 1971) with India saw Pakistan launching the initial major attacks 
with its main strike corps in the heart of Punjab, aiming to capture strategic 
objectives/territory, which could be used as a bargaining chip, or to show success for both 
internal and external consumption.  A second strike corps, also called the army reserve 
south, is kept in reserve to counterattack against a subsequent offensive, or launch an 
offensive along a different axis.27 
India has a significant numerical advantage in armored and mechanized forces.  It 
has a two-to-one advantage in tanks and a three-to-one advantage in modern tanks.  India 
also has true infantry fighting vehicles, giving its mechanized infantry much more 
firepower and mobility than the Pakistani infantry.  The qualitative gap between the 
Indian and Pakistani armies is continuing to grow since India has been able to purchase 
or develop more modern military equipment.28  Joint operations between India’s armed 
services are progressing, and all arms cooperation, particularly in the RAPID units, are 
well established.  The Indian army is moving slowly but surely from an infantry centered 
model to a more modern mechanized force, giving it greater offensive capability.29  
Equipment plays an important role in analyzing the relative capability of a military force.  
Numbers are important, but the quality of equipment and level of training are equally 
important.  Pakistanis contend that the quality of their armed services can make up for the 
lack of military capability on paper.30  Internal security requirements are growing in 
India, and may detract from military readiness.  India also may have to plan on guarding 
                                                 
26 General Mirza Aslam Beg, “Deterrence, Defense and Development,” Defense Journal (July 1999), 
at http://www.defencejournal.com?jul99/deterrence.htm>; Jane’s, “Army, Pakistan,” 1–5; Cordesman, The 
Conventional Military Balance, 9-11; and Firdaus Ahmed, “The Need to Revisit Conventional Doctrine,” 
11 August 2002, at <http://www.ipcs.org/issues/800/816-ndi-firdaus.html>. 
27 See Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 341; Jane’s, “Army, Pakistan,” 1–5; and Cordesman, The Conventional Military 
Balance, 9-11. 
28 Jones, Force Modernization Trends-India and Pakistan, 10-12; and Jones, Military Asymmetry and 
Instability in Emerging Nuclear States: India and Pakistan. 
29 Jane’s, “Army, India,” 1-7; and Cordesman, The Conventional Military Balance, 9-11. 
30 Ahmad Faruqi, “Military Scales Don’t All Tip India’s Way,” Defence Journal (April 2002), at 
<http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/april/military.htm>.  
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its border with China, further diluting its military strength.31  Another major factor in 
war fighting ability is the sustainment of military forces.  India has the capability to 
produce and repair major pieces of military equipment, giving it a significant advantage 
in a longer war of attrition. 
 
Table 1.   India and Pakistan – Army32 
 Personnel Tanks Light Armor Artillery (see note) 
India 1,100,00 3,700 1,800 3,600 (T) /180 (SP) 
Pakistan 550,000 2,500 500 2,000 (T) /270 (SP) 
Note: (T) is towed artillery; (SP) is self-propelled artillery 
 
2. Air Forces and Role 
The Indian Air Force (IAF) is the fourth largest in the world, and is highly 
regarded for its professionalism.  Its headquarters are in New Delhi, and there are six 
regional operational commands.  The senior officer is the Chief of Air Staff.  India has 
moved most of its strike aircraft out of range of air attack from potential enemies.33 
The IAF has a total strength of 150,000 personnel, and about 736 combat aircraft 
(see Table 2).  These aircraft are a mixture of French, British, and Russian planes, 
primarily fighters or fighter-bombers, but with some bombers.   The most common 
aircraft are the MiG-21 and the MiG-27.  The MiG-21s are currently undergoing an 
upgrading process to extend both their life cycle and capabilities.  India has attempted to 
manufacture an indigenous strike aircraft, Light Combat Aircraft, which is currently 
being tested.  The IAF also has a growing long-range strike capability, which includes 
British Jaguar and Sukhoi SU-30 aircraft.  The Minister of Defense and Air Force Chief 
Marshall announced that the first squadron of SU-30s was operational on 27 September 
2002, and also noted the possibility of purchasing six air-to-air refueling tankers from 
                                                 
31 Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army, 339. 
32 After Jane’s, “Executive Summary, Pakistan,” and Cordesman, The Conventional Military Balance, 
6-7. 
33 “Air Force, India,” in Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment South Asia, no. 10 (31 May 2002), 1-5, at 
<http://online.janes.com/>; and Cordesman, The Conventional Military Balance, 13-14. 
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Uzbekistan.34  There is a shortage of in-flight refueling capability and of airborne early 
warning.  However, these may receive a higher priority and increased funding in the 
future.  India has experienced a high aircraft accident rate and has a shortfall of trained 
pilots.  India has developed some indigenous production and maintenance facilities that 
play a major role in sustaining the force.35  
India’s air doctrine is designed to support the offense-defense doctrine.  The four 
components of Indian air doctrine are counter-air, destruction of enemy defense 
infrastructure, interdiction of enemy ground forces, and close air support.  The IAF 
focused on close air support up to the 1971 War, but has since grown more independent 
and gained a wider variety of roles, including deep strike and maritime patrolling.  The 
development and purchase of advanced and precision-guided munitions gives the Air 
Force a growing capability.36  The IAF also may have a nuclear attack role since India is 
still developing and testing ballistic missiles.     
The Pakistani Air Force (PAF) is assessed as being a well-trained, professional 
force.  It established a good operational record in the wars with India.  The PAF is 
headquartered in Chaklala, close to Islamabad, and consists of three major commands: 
Central, Northern, and Southern. It consists of eighteen squadrons, with greatest 
importance attached to the Central Command, which includes the capital and portions of 
the border with India.37 
The PAF has approximately 414 combat aircraft and personnel strength of about 
45,000 (see Table 2).  Most of Pakistan’s combat aircraft are multi-role fighter-bombers; 
useful for both air defense and close air support.  The aircraft are a mixture of U.S., 
French, and Chinese manufacture.  The diversity of aircraft types and suppliers is 
probably a factor in the overall logistical problems experienced by the air force.  Pakistan 
requires external support of parts and other equipment to maintain its aircraft.  The U.S.                                                  
34 Rajat Pandi, “IAF Inducts Sukhoi-30MKI” in Times of India (28 September 2002), 1. 
35 See Rahul Bedi “Technical and Cost Problems stall India’s LCA,” Jane’s Defense Weekly (2 April 
2000); “MOU Signed for LCA Production” Times of India (7 June 2002) at 
<http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/06/07/stories/2002060702161200.htm>; Jane’s, “Air Force, 
India,” 1-5, and Cordesman, The Conventional Military Balance, 13-14. 
36 Jones, Force Modernization Trends-India and Pakistan, 11. 
37 “Air Force, Pakistan,” in Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, South Asia, no. 10 (31 May 2002), 1-
4, at <http://online.janes.com/>; and Cordesman, The Conventional Military Balance, 13-14. 
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arms embargo has had a significant impact on the operational readiness of Pakistan’s F-
16s, its most capable aircraft.  Pakistan has been able to upgrade some of its fighters, but 
many of these aircraft are past their prime, having been superseded by more modern 
aircraft in better-funded air forces.38  Pilots receive about 210 flying hours per year, and 
have been able to achieve and maintain good proficiency.39 
The Indian Air Force has a qualitative and quantitative advantage over the 
Pakistani Air Force.  The Mirage 2000, SU-30, and MiG-29 aircraft are much more 
modern than aircraft in the Pakistani Air Force, including the F-16.  The two-to-one 
overall advantage in aircraft grows to almost a six-to-one advantage when one compares 
just the most modern and capable aircraft.40  This has led some to contend that India 
would gain air superiority within several days of hostilities under general combat 
conditions, a position with which Pakistan strongly disagrees.41 
 
Table 2.   India and Pakistan – Air Force42 
 Personnel Combat Aircraft 
India 150,00 736 
Pakistan 45,000 414 
 
C. COMPARING STRATEGIC FORCES 
 Strategic forces include nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and the 
doctrine that guides their usage.  The information used in this thesis is based upon 
unofficial sources or estimates, given that these are closely guarded state secrets.  The 
available information does allow for a good understanding of the state of weaponization, 
including weapon design, type of fissile material, yield, and delivery systems.  It is also 
                                                 
38 Jones, Force Modernization Trends-India and Pakistan. 
39 Jane’s, “Air Force, Pakistan,” 1-4; and Cordesman, The Conventional Military Balance, 13-14. 
40 Jones, Force Modernization Trends-India and Pakistan. 
41 Rodney W. Jones, Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Quest for Assured Nuclear Deterrence-A 
Conjecture, vol. 19  (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, January 2002), 22-23; and Air Commodore 
(Retd) Jamal Hussain, “Pakistan’s Excellence in Air Combat: PAF’s Forte,” Defence Journal, April 2002, 
at <http://defencejournal.com/2002/april/combat.htm>.  
42 After Jane’s, “Executive Summary, Pakistan,” and Cordesman, The Conventional Military Balance, 
6-7. 
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probably fair to say that the semi-official pronouncements of nuclear policy are close to 
the actual policies, and can serve as a basis for the later application of conditions under 
which conventional warfare could escalate to nuclear warfare. 
 
1. Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material Capabilities 
The exact number of India’s nuclear weapons is a closely guarded state secret; 
however, there are a number of estimates available.  On the low end of the spectrum, 
David Albright estimated that India had accumulated between 240 kg and 395 kg of 
weapons grade plutonium by 1999 (see Table 3).  At 4.5 kg per bomb, this would be 
sufficient for approximately 65 bombs with a nominal yield of 10 to 20 kilotons if the 
weapons were simple fission bombs.43  Ashley Tellis’ low estimate corresponds to 
Albright’s.  However, Tellis also gives several other data points.  The medium estimate is 
approximately 450 kg of plutonium, equating to about 90 nuclear weapons at five kg per 
weapon.  The highest figure is 570 kg, which equals 115 nuclear weapons.44  Peter Lavoy 
added additional quantities plutonium to these amounts to update the estimates to the 
2002 timeframe.45  
If India is able and willing to use reactor-grade plutonium in the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons the above estimates may be low.  Reports following the Pokhran test 
indicated that one of the bombs tested might have been made from “dirty plutonium.”  
This is understood to mean non-weapons grade or reactor-grade plutonium.  India has a 
large amount of reactor-grade plutonium since it has been running nuclear power stations 
for years.  Additionally, India has a long-standing effort to produce highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) for its planned nuclear submarine, or advanced technology vehicle 
(ATV).  When produced, this material could be used for nuclear weapons, giving India 
access to a significant increase in weapon grade material.46   
                                                 
43 David Albright, “India’s and Pakistan’s Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventories, end of 
1999,” (Institute for Science and International Security, 11 October 2000), at <http://www.isis-
online.org/publications/southasia/stocks1000.html>. 
44 Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 55-56, 484. 
45 Peter R. Lavoy, “Fighting Terrorism and Avoiding War in South Asia: U.S. Relations with India 
and Pakistan after 11 September,” forthcoming in Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 2002. 
46 Tellis, 231. 
18 
How many nuclear weapons does India need to feel secure?  This is tied closely to 
India’s doctrinal requirements for nuclear weapons, what they will be used for, and who 
will be deterred.  India has not officially announced how many nuclear weapons it 
requires, but K. Subrahmanyam made statements that India initially needed about 60 
weapons in 1994, later changed to 150 nuclear weapons in 1999.47   
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are based upon HEU produced by high-speed 
centrifuges, and total production is very difficult to assess.  Estimates range from low to 
high in the total amount of special materials and number of weapons (see Table 3).   
Tellis provided a low figure of about 200 kg of HEU, and using 15 kg as the baseline 
amount needed for a simple fission weapon, this leads to about thirteen bombs producing 
a nominal yield of some 10 to 20 kilotons.  His medium estimate, based upon continued 
HEU production, is about 400 kg of HEU, equating to approximately 23 to 26 
weapons.48  Albright estimated that Pakistan had about 690 kg of HEU in 1999, and 
again using 15 kg as the baseline amount needed for a weapon, this leads to about 46 
weapons.49  HEU production could be re-started at any time, especially if Pakistan has 
already produced low or medium enriched uranium.  175-200 kg of HEU could be 
produced within weeks, effectively doubling Pakistan’s weapons inventory.  Peter Lavoy 
again extrapolates these estimates out to 2002.50  
Pakistan may now also produce weapons-grade plutonium at the Khushab reactor.  
This reactor was commissioned in 1998, and is reportedly capable of producing about 10 
to 15 kg of plutonium a year, equating to two to three weapons of more compact design 
than those of HEU.  How much has been reprocessed is unknown.51  Plutonium not only 
would augment Pakistan’s fissile material, but also would add to the size of its nuclear 
arsenal as by as many as a dozen if Khushab has been able to produce weapons grade 
plutonium at full capacity since commissioned.  Perhaps most importantly, plutonium 
gives a more compact design, perhaps important in the weaponization process.  Pakistan 
                                                 
47 Ibid, 485. 
48 Ibid, 55-57. 
49 Albright, India’s and Pakistan’s Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventories. 
50 Lavoy, “Fighting Terrorism and Avoiding War in South Asia.” 
51 Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, 56-57; Albright, India’s and Pakistan’s Fissile Material 
and Nuclear Weapons Inventories. 
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may have requirements for 70 nuclear weapons to meet its strategic needs, according to 
claims made by Pakistani scientists in 1998.  Other Pakistani officials felt that the number 
of nuclear weapons was irrelevant since even limited numbers could serve as a useful 
deterrent.52 
The May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan provide a baseline for data on 
nuclear yields.  India’s claimed yields were 43 kilotons, 12 kilotons, and a third device of 
less than a kiloton.  Two other tests had minimal yields, and may have been used to test 
other design features.53  However, seismic data puts these figures in doubt, and range 
from an estimated total yield from as low as 10 kilotons, to as high as 25-30 kilotons, 
with the latter figures thought to be the most accurate.  Pakistan claimed yields of 25 and 
12 kilotons, with the rest being less than one kiloton.  In this case, seismic data also did 
not support the announced yields, and yields were estimated on the order of 9-12 kilotons 
total for the 28 May test, and 4-6 kilotons for the 30 May test.54  While the total yield of 
the tests can be debated, the fact that both India and Pakistan have produced and tested 
weapons with sufficient yield to provide for significant destruction is proven.  These 
yields would also seem to indicate that only simple fission weapons have been tested.  
Both sides also have sufficient numbers of weapons even at the lowest estimated numbers 
to do tremendous damage in a nuclear exchange. 
 
Table 3.   Indian and Pakistani Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Capability55 
 Weapon-Grade Plutonium (kg) 
Low         Medium       High 
Weapon-Grade Uranium (kg) 
Low           Medium         High 
Weapon Capability 
Low      Medium       High 
India 280             400             600 Unknown  Unknown  Unknown 40              70              120 
Pakistan  5                  15               45 815               1020            1230 35              60              95 
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2. Nuclear Delivery Systems 
India probably still relies upon aircraft for the nuclear delivery mission, even 
though India pursued ballistic missile technology beginning at an early date.  These 
missiles may also be nuclear delivery systems, though the operational capability may not 
be as well established as the aircraft.56  India’s nuclear-capable aircraft consist of the 
Jaguar, Mirage 2000, and Sukhoi SU-30s, with the SU-30 being the most capable, even if 
primarily designed as an air superiority fighter.  The SU-30 is a two-seat aircraft and is 
capable of great range due to in-flight refueling, and has hard points for weapons and fuel 
up to 8,000 kg.57  India is reported to be leasing two to four long-range TU-22 Backfire 
bombers from Russia, and has options to lease more.58  Claims have been made that 
India has fully tested simulated nuclear weapons with the Mirage 2000 aircraft.59  It is 
important to note that all of these aircraft are capable of being used in conventional roles, 
a fact that probably complicates Pakistani defensive measures.  
India has also tested and produced several missile systems including the Prithvi 1 
and 2 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), and the Agni medium range ballistic 
missiles (MRBM) (see Table 4).  Approximately 75-150 Prithvi 1 have been produced.60  
These missiles belong to the Army’s 333 Missile Group, and are stationed close to the 
Pakistani border.  The Prithvi 1 is most likely to have a tactical role because of its short 
range, even though it is technically capable of carrying nuclear warheads.61  The Air 
Force is currently fielding the Prithvi 2, and may have as many as 25-50 on-hand.62  The 
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greater range of the Prithvi 2 makes it a more likely candidate for a nuclear delivery 
system compared to the Prithvi 1, but is still handicapped by short range.  A one-stage 
solid fuel version of the Agni 1 (MRBM) achieved a range of 700 km in 2002, but may 
have a range of 700-900 km.  This version of the Agni can reach all of Pakistan, while the 
hybrid solid-liquid versions have a much longer range, about 2,500 to 3,000 km.  The 
longer range Agni 2 cannot reach Beijing or other major cities in northwest China.63  
India may have fully tested simulated nuclear weapons in the Agni 2 missile, and as 
many as five to six missiles plus support equipment may be available for use.  Indian 
authorities have stated that the Agni is fully operational and deployed.64  As longer-range 
ballistic missiles become operational they may replace aircraft as the prime delivery 
system for nuclear weapons. 
Pakistan has several types of aircraft, including the Mirage III and F-16, that are 
capable of being used for a nuclear strike.65  However, these aircraft have limited ranges 
and are vulnerable to India’s air defense systems, making them a less reliable nuclear 
delivery system than ballistic missiles.  Pakistan is thought to rely upon ballistic missiles 
as the preferred nuclear delivery system, but air delivery should not be ruled out.66   
Pakistan has developed solid and liquid-fueled missile that are capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons (see Table 4).67  Pakistan has been very aggressive in 
developing ballistic missiles, gaining the Hatf 3/M-11 SRBM from China, and several 
longer-range missiles, including the liquid-fueled Hatf 5/Ghauri, a North Korean No-
Dong derivative, and the Hatf 4/ Shaheen 1, and the Hatf 6/Shaheen 2.68  The Hatf 3 has 
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a 290 km range with a 500 kg warhead, the Hatf 4 has a range of 6-700 km with a 500 kg 
warhead, and the Hatf 5 has a range of up to 1,500 km with a 760 kg warhead.69  There 
are about 30 Hatf 3/M-11 missiles that may be stored in a facility close to Lahore at 
Sargodha, and could strike India with very little warning.  Pakistan continues to develop 
the Hatf 6, a longer-range missile.  Pakistan also may have as many as 12 Hatf 5/Ghauri 
missiles.70  Pakistan’s emphasis on ballistic missiles has probably allowed it to gain a 
better operational capability with its missiles than India has with theirs. 
Once again there is a degree of asymmetry in the strategic force structure of India 
and Pakistan.  India has a distinct advantage in the capability to deliver nuclear weapons 
via aircraft, while Pakistan may have an advantage in the quantity of nuclear-capable 
ballistic missiles.  The numbers of advanced nuclear capable aircraft and the ability to 
widely disperse them gives India an assured retaliatory capability, while Pakistan’s 
limited number of aircraft and bases may not.  However, Pakistan’s solid-fueled missiles 
enjoy a smaller signature on the ground compared to India’s liquid-fueled missiles due to 
a reduced support infrastructure, but the short-range solid-fuel version of the Agni-1 will 
remedy this when operational.  Pakistan’s missiles also have the ability to move and fire 
quickly, making them very survivable.  India and Pakistan both have very limited 
response time due to the proximity of strategic systems to the targets. 
Table 4.   India and Pakistan – Ballistic Missiles71 
Country Missile Range Status 
Prithvi 1 (SS-150) 150 km Army version, in service 
Prithvi 2 (SS-250) 250 km Air Force version, tested, in development 
Prithvi 3 (Dhanush) 350 km Navy version, failed test in 2000 
Agni 1 700-900 km Tested 25 January 2002, in development 





Agni 3 3,500-4,000 km In early development 
Hatf 1 80 km In service since mid-1990s 
Hatf 2 (Abdali) 180 km Tested May 2002, in production 
Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi) 290 km M-11, tested May 2002, in service 
Hatf 4 (Shaheen 1) 600-700 km Tested October 2002, in service 





Hatf 6 (Shaheen 2) 2,000-2,500 km Not yet tested, in development 
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D. NUCLEAR DOCTRINE 
The final factor to consider in the potential interplay of conventional and strategic 
forces in South Asia are India and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines.  Nuclear doctrine defines 
the role that strategic weapons play, particularly how and under what circumstances these 
weapons will be used.  Once again we must deal with a lack of transparency since both 
India and Pakistan have cloaked their nuclear doctrines in secrecy.  However, public 
statements by senior officials provide sufficient details to make an informed analysis. 
 
1. India’s Nuclear Doctrine 
 The National Security Advisory Board produced India’s draft nuclear doctrine in 
August 1999.  The board represented a cross section of India’s military, political, and 
scientific community.  The draft doctrine is based upon a retaliatory, no-first-use policy 
with the goal of deterring nuclear attacks, although other reasons to use nuclear weapons 
may not have been ruled out completely.  India may not have thought through other 
contingencies, such as Pakistan using a nuclear weapon on its own territory in response to 
an Indian invasion.  The doctrine is based on minimum credible deterrence.  This doctrine 
envisions the following cornerstones: survivability, robust command and control, 
effective intelligence and early warning capability, planning and training, and finally the 
will to employ these weapons should deterrence fail.  The government refused to 
officially endorse this draft proposal, leaving India’s nuclear doctrine in an ambiguous 
status.72   
India’s views on nuclear weapons are much different than Pakistan’s, and may be 
designed for political utility, as well as for deterrence value.73  Targeting philosophy is 
not specifically spelled out in the draft nuclear doctrine, but there is a theme of punitive 
response that would seem to imply a counter-value strategy.  Pakistan’s major cities and 
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industrial areas could be readily targeted and attacked with either aircraft or ballistic 
missiles.74  Alternatively, India could target Pakistan’s military of nuclear facilities in a 
counter-force attack given the short ranges and knowledge of Pakistan’s military 
capabilities.75  The survivability of India’s nuclear forces may be ensured through 
secrecy and dispersal, including separating weapons from delivery systems.  India’s 
nuclear doctrine may be in a state of transition, since it does mention of a nuclear triad 
and command and control functions that may not currently exist.76   
 
2. Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine 
Pakistan has not publicly announced an official nuclear doctrine.  However, there 
have been public statements by senior officials that may indicate what that policy is.  
Major General Khalid Kidwai, chief of Pakistan’s Strategic Plan Division, provided a 
great deal of information on Pakistan’s doctrine in an interview conducted in late 2000.  
Kidwai left no doubt that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine was directed at India.  He claimed 
that four different scenarios could threaten Pakistan’s existence as a state and cause the 
use of nuclear weapons.  All four scenarios are in response to India’s actions and include 
the loss of a large part of Pakistan’s territory, destruction of a large part of Pakistan’s 
military, economic strangulation, or other attempts to politically de-stabilize Pakistan.77     
Pakistan could use nuclear weapons if faced with a major military defeat or the 
occupation or threatened occupation of vital areas.78  These circumstances are in 
agreement with three general themes that may outline what Pakistan believes are the 
“red-line” or point where it must use nuclear weapons.  The first theme may be to deter a 
large-scale conventional war with India, particularly an Indian invasion with a goal of 
splitting Pakistan in half.  The use of nuclear weapons in this scenario can be thought of 
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as ensuring national survival.  The second contingency could be to deter nuclear threats 
or nuclear coercion by India, and may include pre-emption of a nuclear attack by India.  
Finally, Pakistan could resort to the use of its nuclear weapons to deter India from using 
its stockpile of chemical weapons as declared under the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
although this does not resonate across other scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons.79  
India has committed to destroying its chemical weapon stocks. 
Pakistan may have a simple counter-value nuclear targeting doctrine to deter India 
by holding major population and economic centers at risk.  Pakistan has developed 
longer-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching many of India’s major cities.  An 
alternative to targeting India’s cities would be to target India’s military forces, 
particularly large mechanized formations that may be threatening Pakistan.  Either 
missiles or aircraft would be capable of attacking major military formations.  Pakistan 
could use one or two nuclear weapons as a warning shot, by detonating the weapons on 
its own soil as a sign that further escalation would be severely punished.80 
Pakistan’s nuclear forces are an integral part of Pakistan’s defensive strategy, and 
are viewed as the ultimate guarantee of national survival.81  This doctrine does not 
include a no-first-use clause, leaving Pakistan with a de facto first-use option to offset 
India’s conventional superiority, somewhat akin to NATO doctrine during the Cold War.  
A no-first-use pledge could undermine the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence 
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E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter describes the military asymmetries that currently exist in South Asia.  
India has achieved numerical and qualitative superiority in many categories, particularly 
in mechanized ground forces and in attack aircraft.  India is also improving its 
conventional military forces at a rate that Pakistan cannot match due to a disparity of 
resources.  Both India and Pakistan have relatively small nuclear arsenals.  Pakistan has 
attempted to offset India’s conventional advantage by building a nuclear force, while 
India’s nuclear deterrence is designed primarily to deter nuclear attack.  Pakistan has put 
most of its emphasis on ballistic missile delivery systems, and probably has achieved a 
good operational capability, while it continues to fall behind in nuclear delivery aircraft.  
India had the initial lead in missile technology, but failed to follow through, causing it to 
lose its initial advantage.  India currently is putting greater emphasis on its missile 
program, and the number and quality of nuclear capable aircraft continues to grow.  This 
asymmetry of means is reinforced by asymmetry of methods, especially in nuclear 
doctrine.  India has a retaliatory doctrine, while Pakistan reserves a first-use option to 
deter India’s conventional superiority.  These factors have a tremendous influence on the 




III. SURVIVABILITY AT RISK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Can conventional warfare threaten the survival of strategic forces (that is, nuclear 
weapons and delivery systems)?  Conventional warfare in this paper generally refers to 
larger scale conventional operations, not a more limited conflict such as that fought in 
Kargil in 1999. Large-scale conventional operations could potentially degrade the 
survivability of the opponent’s nuclear option by coming into contact with the nuclear 
forces of an adversary and substantially affecting the victim’s confidence in its future 
ability to operate those forces in ways that he had counted upon.83  As Barry Posen 
observed, this possibility could be very problematic for “small or medium-sized nuclear 
powers, since they will have the most difficult time building nuclear forces that can 
survive.”84  This situation applies to the strategic relationship between India and 
Pakistan.   
A secure second-strike capability is an essential part of deterrence.  This means 
that the strategic force must be able to survive to retaliate if attacked first.85  
Traditionally, this has meant that strategic forces must be able to survive a nuclear attack.  
This led both the United States and the Soviet Union to develop nuclear triads made up of 
long-range bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine-based missiles.  Posen’s study 
demonstrated that NATO or Warsaw Pact conventional military operations could threaten 
the survival of strategic forces and consequently undermine stable nuclear deterrence.  
Can the same be said of India and Pakistan? 
This chapter examines how conventional forces can threaten the survivability of 
strategic forces and potentially cause an inadvertent escalation to nuclear war.  It begins 
by examining the question of strategic depth, one of the critical factors that dictate much 
of the military force structure and strategy in South Asia.  Next, scenarios for ground and 
air campaigns are studied, with both India and Pakistan initiating military action.  This 
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technique brings to light some of the shortfalls of equipment, doctrine, and strategy that 
could lead conventional forces to place strategic forces at risk.  Pakistan’s lack of 
strategic depth could lead to Indian conventional ground or air forces coming into contact 
with Pakistan’s strategic nuclear forces.  This could cause Pakistan to use nuclear 
weapons, since the loss of this asset would undermine its military strategy.  The converse 
is probably not true; India’s greater strategic depth and superior military capabilities 
would prevent Pakistan’s forces from seriously threatening India’s strategic forces with 
conventional forces. 
 
B. SURVIVABILITY OF STRATEGIC FORCES 
 India and Pakistan rely primarily on secrecy and dispersal to ensure the 
survivability of their relatively small strategic nuclear forces.  Strategic depth, or the lack 
of it, plays a major role in the potential for ground and air operations to threaten the 
survival of the strategic weapon systems and cause inadvertent escalation. 
 
1. India’s Strategic Depth  
India has all of the advantages of strategic depth.  This allows India to disperse 
strategic forces widely among numerous sites, installations, and airfields.  India may still 
rely on aircraft for nuclear delivery, but this may be a workable solution for a secure 
second-strike capability due to India’s comparatively large number of aircraft and units 
capable of performing nuclear delivery.  India has been developing several types of 
missiles to deliver a nuclear warhead.  The Prithvi may not have a nuclear delivery role 
due to its short range.  There may be as few as six Agni missiles in India’s arsenal, 
perhaps requiring them to be saved for a potential threat from China.  The Agni’s longer-
range combined with India’s strategic depth would probably make them invulnerable to 
Pakistani attack.  Another factor that enhances the survivability of India’s nuclear 
deterrent is the doctrinal separation of the nuclear weapons from the delivery systems, 
and the civilian control of the weapons themselves, as discussed in Chapter 2.  Unlike 
aircraft, missile systems must rely upon what may be a limited number of ancillary 
support equipment, such as transporter erector launchers (TEL).  The Prithvi and the 
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current two-stage version of the Agni are liquid-fueled, requiring intense logistical 
support to operate, and have a corresponding large signature.  Strategic depth can 
compensate in large measure for this shortcoming (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.   India and Pakistan86 
      
 
2. Pakistan’s Lack of Strategic Depth 
Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth means many of its airfields and strategic assets 
are close to India.  There are far fewer Pakistani aircraft and units able to perform the 
nuclear delivery role compared to India.  However, Pakistan has offset this disadvantage 
by vigorously pursuing ballistic missiles.  Several types of road-mobile missiles are 
available for use.  The Hatf 3 and -4 use solid-fuel, with only the Ghauri using liquid-
fuel, which makes for a very reliable delivery option.  Solid-fueled missiles have a much 
smaller logistical support train and corresponding signature compared to liquid-fueled 
rockets, representing a major advance in military technology.  The small signature of 
these systems may play a major role in their survivability.  These missile systems must 
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C. CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING IN A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT 
Could the conventional and strategic forces of India and Pakistan interact in such 
a manner that inadvertent nuclear escalation could result?  The force structure and 
doctrine of both nations reflect an aggressive, offensively oriented mindset, whether 
termed as offensive-defensive doctrine or riposte doctrine.  Historical precedents show 
that both India and Pakistan are willing to engage in offensive military actions, either in 
an initial attack or a strong counterattack.  India and Pakistan have invested in armored 
and mechanized forces with a good offensive capability, and dual-purpose fighter-
bombers are very complementary to this strategy.  Offensive actions consisted primarily 
of air and ground forces in previous military engagements, and will be the focus of this 
section. 
 
1. Historical Example 
The last two major wars fought in South Asia were in 1965 and 1971, and can 
serve as starting points for the study of large-scale conventional warfare on the sub-
continent.  The dispute over the Rann of Kutch, a marshy area located on the southern 
border between India and Pakistan, erupted into battle in April 1965.  The Pakistan Army 
enjoyed the advantages of an established road network on its side of the border and 
quickly routed Indian outposts in the region with a well-coordinated attack.  Pakistan 
became emboldened by its relatively easy success and by mid-August Indian and 
Pakistan regular Army forces were skirmishing in the border regions between West 
Pakistan and India.  The Pakistani plan to link military forces with the guerrillas in 
Kashmir failed when local officials apprehended most of the guerrillas and turned them 
over to the Indian Army.87   
The Indian Army gained the initiative in late August 1965 when it crossed the 
border into Pakistan, which in turn caused the Pakistan Army to retaliate with its own 
offensive on 1 September.  The PAF launched a series of relatively unsuccessful air 
attacks on Indian military bases and installation.  Airpower was widely used by both 
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sides in support of ground operations, and the Pakistani Army was able to penetrate 
toward Akhnur.  The Indian Army mounted a major counteroffensive through the Punjab 
towards Lahore on 6 September to remove pressure from other sectors, stopping only at 
the outskirts of the city.  A simultaneous Indian thrust on a different avenue in the 
vicinity of the Pakistani city of Sialkot resulted in the largest clash of forces during the 
war with approximately 400-600 tanks joined in battle.  The development of a military 
stalemate on the ground caused the conflict ground to a halt on 17 September.  Total 
losses were much higher than in the 1947 war with nearly 7,000 total deaths, and 
approximately 100 aircraft and 400 tanks lost by the participants.  The Line of Control 
(LOC) that now divides Indian-held Kashmir from Pakistani-held Kashmir became an 
un-welcomed fact of life, but little territory was lost during the war.88   
The next major clash between India and Pakistan occurred in December 1971.  
The cause of this war was complex.  An internal civil war was being waged in East 
Pakistan between the Muslim Bengalis and the elite rulers of Pakistan who were 
overwhelmingly West Pakistani.  Another important factor was Pakistan’s assessment 
that the window of opportunity to confront India militarily was rapidly shrinking due to 
India’s growing military and economic strength.89  Pakistan launched a surprise air attack 
on Indian military bases in the Northwest Territories on 3 December 1971 in coordination 
with a ground attack into Kashmir, Punjab, and Rajasthan.  India retaliated with its own 
air attacks and a counteroffensive, including naval bombardment of the port city of 
Karachi.  There was heavy fighting in the border regions of India and West Pakistan, 
including a major tank battle in the Sialkot-Shakargarh area, and another northwest of the 
city of Jaisalmer.  The IAF played a major role in this sector, mounting some 4,000 
sorties, allowing the Indian Army to concentrate on their eastern front.90 
The Indian Army invaded Eastern Pakistan, which became the site of the heaviest 
fighting.  The Pakistani Army assumed a defensive posture, destroying bridges in this 
mostly delta region and fortifying strong points.  The IAF succeeded in destroying 
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Pakistan’s limited air assets in the area in the initial air raids, and the Navy effectively 
blockaded the entirety of East Pakistan.  The Indian Army was able to mount a sustained 
offensive by crossing the rivers using a combination of local shipping and helicopters.  
Indian forces continued to advance on Dacca, the regional capital, and reached the 
outskirts of the city by 16 December.91  Approximately 93,000 Pakistani troops 
surrendered in East Pakistan, which subsequently became Bangladesh. This eastern 
offensive was very successful and a ceasefire was brokered on 17 December.  Pakistani 
losses were much heavier than those of India, with 200 tanks, 75 aircraft, 1 submarine 
and nearly 9,000 battlefield deaths compared to the loss of 80 tanks, 45 aircraft, 1 frigate, 
and 2,500 casualties by India.92 
These previous campaigns show that both India and Pakistan have the capacity for 
offensive ground and air actions.  Current force structure and doctrine demonstrate that 
they retain this capacity.  How could this play out on the subcontinent in the event of a 
large-scale conventional conflict?  
 
2. Asymmetric Conventional Strategies 
India and Pakistan have asymmetric conventional military strategies.  India has 
recently developed a doctrine of limited war.  This plan is designed to “punish” Pakistan 
without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear “red-line.”93  Pakistan has a riposte strategy that calls 
for absorbing an initial attack and counter-attacking along a different line of approach. 
India’s limited war strategy seeks to undermine what it believes is Pakistan’s use 
of the stability-instability paradox.  The stability-instability paradox is defined as the use 
of nuclear deterrence to support conventional military aggression.94  Indian Minister of 
Defense Fernandes and COAS General Malik announced in January 2000 that India 
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could fight a conventional campaign against Pakistan, despite Pakistan’s possession of 
nuclear weapons.95  India’s limited war doctrine recognizes the link between deterrence 
and limited war and is based upon the concept threat waging a limited conventional war 
is the most important part of deterrence.  Limited war primarily entails controlling 
escalation by limiting the duration of military actions, scope (depth) of actions, and/or 
force levels.96  
This limited war strategy gives India four basic options.  The first option is to 
attack across the international boundary or LOC, but to keep the objectives limited.  The 
second option is to attack at selected points along the LOC, presenting Pakistan with the 
option of escalating by responding with a riposte.  The third option is to capture and hold 
a critical area along the LOC.  The final option is to carry out surgical strikes across the 
border, then return.97  
The 1999 Kargil Crisis is yet another example of the Indian strategy of limited 
war.  Indian forces responded to infiltration in the Kargil area of the LOC under orders 
not to cross the international border.  However, Indian military forces operating on their 
side of the border were heavily reinforced in terms of numbers of troops, equipment, and 
amount of firepower used.  This allowed India to gain the upper hand in the local area 
without causing escalation to a larger scale conflict.98  
 
3. Ground Campaign 
The Indian armed forces completely mobilized in late 2001 following the terrorist 
attack on the Indian Parliament.  Pakistan’s Defense Journal provided a very detailed 
account of India’s mobilization and possible strategies.  Most of India’s mechanized 
might was mobilized in positions from which they could strike Pakistan, with one strike 
corps threatening the southern part of Azad Kashmir, two in Punjab, and one oriented 
towards Sindh.  The majority of the armored and RAPID units were positioned in 
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Rajasthan where they could attack along the Jaisalmer-Rahimyar Khan or Barmer-
Mirpurkhas routes.99 
There are historical precedents for this positioning and strategy.  Indian offensive 
forces penetrated as far as Lahore during the 1965 war, and a supporting offensive 
threatened Sialkot that had the potential to cut Pakistan in half.  India may choose not to 
mount a full-scale attack for fear of crossing Pakistan’s “red-line” and provoking a 
nuclear response.  This may prompt India to adopt a smaller-scale ground offensive with 
much more limited goals.  Indian perception of Pakistan’s “red-lines” appear to recognize 
that total military defeat could cause nuclear retaliation.  However, recent military 
exercises continue to practice similar tactics to those used during the 1965 war (i.e., a 
full-scale mechanized thrust).  Operation Divine Power in 1998 and Total Victory in 
2001 put Indian mechanized forces into the Rajasthan region where they could rapidly 
attack into Pakistan.100   
An Indian attack akin to that launched in the 1965 war could penetrate deeply 
toward Lahore, which is in Pakistan’s 4 and 5 Corps sectors (see Figure 2).  If this attack 
is a diversion, then the main attack could be aimed further south, close to Rahim Yar 
Khan.  This region is little more than 70 kilometers wide, and an attack there could cut 
Pakistan’s vital north south supply routes again threatening to cut Pakistan in half at its 
narrow waist.101  This strategy gives India a numerical advantage in sector.  Indian has 
an overall advantage in number of mechanized units and quality of equipment.  India’s 
larger number of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles may give it an edge in mobility and 
firepower.  India has also worked hard to incorporate air assets in any offensive.  Indian 
air superiority would provide India with a tremendous advantage on the ground, and 
could include the use of advanced ground attack aircraft, such as the Mirage 2000 or SU-
30. 
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Pakistan most likely would deploy its strategic forces if facing a full-scale 
conventional war with India.  Strategic weapons deployment was documented during the 
1986-87 Brasstacks Crisis, 1990 Kashmir Crisis, and the 1999 Kargil Crisis.  Air-
deliverable nuclear weapons were reportedly readied and placed on aircraft during these 
crises.  Reports of SRBM deployments surfaced in the 1999 Kargil Crisis, and in the 
December 2001 to October 2002 crisis.103  Pakistan might use nuclear weapons if facing 
an Indian invasion with a goal of splitting Pakistan in half, as called for by the nuclear 
doctrine.  The use of nuclear weapons in this scenario could be construed as ensuring 
national survival, and to use them purposefully would be deliberate escalation.   
However, escalation also could occur inadvertently.  A rapid advance by the 
Indian army could put the Hatf 3/M-11 missiles at risk if these missiles are stationed at 
Sargodha.  The Hatf 3/M-11 may have to remain fairly far forward to range strategic 
targets in India because of their short range, placing these strategic systems at risk to a 
deep penetration by ground forces.  The same is true of many of Pakistan’s airbases.  The 
longer-range systems developed recently, such as the Ghauri and Hatf 6, would probably 
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be invulnerable to ground attack.  Any deep penetration could threaten to overrun or 
destroy nuclear weapons and delivery systems since Pakistan places great emphasis on 
nuclear deterrence to offset India’s conventional power.  This could potentially prompt a 
use-it-or-lose-it mentality that leads to the use of nuclear weapons.  Pakistan could also 
mistake a major Indian military offensive for an attempt to destroy the country even if the 
attack was more limited and only intended as a demonstration of Indian resolve.  All of 
these situations serve as examples of potential inadvertent escalation.  A more limited 
Indian attack in terms of duration, depth, or force levels could be handled without 
resorting to Pakistani use of nuclear weapons.  However, a strong Pakistani conventional 
response to a limited attack could result in escalation to a general war.   
The Pakistan Army has completely mobilized in more recent crises.104  
Mobilization gives Pakistan three conventional military response options in a 
conventional war with India.  First, Pakistan could take a defensive posture in the hope 
that the war would remain limited, or that the international community would step in and 
prevent further escalation.  Second, Pakistan could remain primarily defensive, but then 
counter-attack either in a limited fashion, or cross the international border and put 
pressure on a different front using the riposte doctrine.  Third, Pakistan could choose to 
mount a pre-emptive attack.  Most of Pakistan’s offensive ground capability is 
represented in the two strike corps that are generally pulled back from the border where 
they are positioned to counterattack, or riposte, against an Indian offensive.105   
The Pakistan Army attacked India in 1965 and 1971 using armored and 
mechanized offensive operations.  Pakistan exercised the second option in 1965, with 
limited local counter-attacks and a major attack towards Beas that put pressure on a 
different front and threatened to cut off Amritsar and Indian forces facing Pakistan’s 
Lahore front.  Pakistan was prepared to launch a strategic riposte in both 1984 and during 
the 1987 Brasstacks Crisis (see Figure 3).  Pakistan launched a pre-emptive attack in 
Punjab in 1971, representing the third option.  These historical cases demonstrate that 
Pakistan has a tendency to take the offensive in the belief that such tactics are stronger 
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than defensive tactics, and that a weaker opponent with the initiative can defeat a 
numerically superior enemy, as shown throughout the Arab-Israeli wars. Pakistan’s strike 
corps could attack across the border and advance towards New Delhi along routes in 
Punjab and the southern desert, or it could mount an offensive to cut Kashmir off from 
the India, as they did during the 1965 India-Pakistan War by launching a pre-emptive 
thrust towards Akhnur aiming to cut off the strategic Akhnur Bridge. 
 
















India enjoys a numerical advantage in ground forces and is roughly equivalent to 
Pakistan in the quality of men and equipment.  Indian forces and defensive lines have 
been arrayed in such a way that probably would stop any Pakistani attack far short of the 
capital.107  India may choose to deploy its strategic forces under the threat of full-scale 
conventional war.  It is unlikely that a major Pakistan ground offensive would make 
contact with India’s strategic forces, given India’s strategic depth and the peacetime 
position of its strategic forces.  Any such contact would be even more unlikely to 
undermine the central tenet of India’s retaliatory-only posture.  Any Indian escalation 
across the nuclear threshold in the context of a ground offensive by Pakistan would likely 
result from deliberate escalation, not inadvertent escalation.  However, a major 
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conventional Pakistani riposte would serve as a conventional escalation, with India 
responding in kind.  Increased force levels could lead to a cycle of escalation, and then in 
turn lead to deliberate or inadvertent nuclear escalation. 
Some commentators note that there seems to be a rough parity between the Indian 
and Pakistani armies despite the overall disparity in numbers.  This view is based on 
several factors.  First, despite their numerical advantage, India has to consider two 
military fronts, the other being China.  Therefore, the entire armed might of India be able 
to be focused on Pakistan.  Secondly, and perhaps most critical in this context, a near 
parity exists between the armies when one considers the armored and mechanized units 
that would be relied upon to make any offensive thrusts, or counterattacks.  It is most 
likely that given this rough parity of forces, limited numbers of routes of advance, and 
years of training and preparation, that any conventional attacks in this region would result 
in a bloody draw, with no real advantage gained by either side.108  The concentration of 
Indian forces on such a narrow front and the growing qualitative and quantitative 
superiority of Indian forces could undermine this parity if it exists today, and may 
completely disappear in the near future if the current trends continue. 
 
4. Air Campaigns 
India could launch deep air strikes or conventionally armed ballistic missiles 
against Pakistan as part of a general war strategy, or as surgical strikes as part of a limited 
response.  Some of the attacks would be successful due to India’s numerical superiority 
of strike aircraft and fighters and Pakistan’s less developed network of air defenses.  
There are also sufficient numbers of Prithvi 1 and -2 missiles to be used in the 
conventional role to attack deep targets.  These attacks could be in the form of pre-
emptive attacks, or as interdiction to limit support for Pakistan ground forces.   
Pakistan formed its Air Defense Command in 1975, and there are four 
subordinate headquarters.  Pakistan has a comprehensive radar network incorporating a 
wide array of military sites and civilian air traffic control radars.  Equipment is assorted, 
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and includes short-range, long-range, and low-level radars, giving Pakistan a good 
capability to detect aircraft.  However, it has very limited time to respond since many 
important installations are very close to the Indian border.  Pakistan’s air defense 
capabilities consist of aircraft, SAMs, and air defense artillery.  Pakistan uses the F-16, 
Mirage III, and Chinese F-7 fighters, which are all fairly capable in the air-to-air 
interceptor role.   
Pakistan has very limited surface to air missile capability, consisting of six to 
eight squadrons of Crotale missiles, and one squadron of Chinese made SA-2s.  However, 
there are large numbers of anti-aircraft guns, with possibly as many as forty-three 
separate units, nominally referred to as regiments, but with much less personnel and 
equipment.109  While national air defense coverage is less than adequate, sensitive 
facilities may have adequate defensive coverage to make them difficult to attack.  
Pakistan does not have any type of defense against ballistic missiles and is unlikely to 
acquire them, since it deems them to be destabilizing.110  These advanced missile 
systems are also very expensive, and may be too much for an already strained defense 
budget. 
Indian air and ballistic missile attacks have the potential to come into contact with 
Pakistan’s strategic forces, particularly if Pakistan’s forces have been mobilized and 
deployed.  Indian air attacks could potentially threaten the survivability of Pakistan’s 
strategic forces.  Successful attacks upon Pakistan could lead to a use-it-or-lose-it 
mentality.  Pakistan could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons under these 
circumstances for fear that they would lose this critical asset. 
Pakistan could launch long-range air attacks on Indian airfields or logistical 
infrastructure similar to the events during the 1965 and 1971 wars, or even use 
conventionally armed ballistic missiles.  Aircraft and longer-range ballistic missiles have 
sufficient range to hit many targets in India’s western regions, where India may have 
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strategic forces stationed.  Such air attacks could be in the form of pre-emptive attacks, or 
as interdiction to limit support for Indian ground forces. 
India has a much more robust air defense system than Pakistan.  It has a nation-
wide advanced air defense ground environment system linking military and civilian 
radars into a coordinated network.  The first layer consists of mobile observation posts, 
which are small teams of observers equipped with binoculars and radios scattered around 
the border.  The radar picket line is next, which is made up of several different radars 
linked into a cluster and tied into a reporting center.  Finally, there are long-range 
surveillance radars based on a French design and produced in India for years, giving the 
air defenses the capability to detect aircraft out to 400 km.   India also has local air 
defense zones to defend high value targets.  This is in a three-layer array also, consisting 
of mobile observation posts, a line of air defense weapons with their associated radar 
control, and finally a line of low-level radars.111   
Most of India’s interceptors are MiG aircraft, including the MiG-29, but dual-role 
aircraft such as the Mirage 2000 and SU-30s are available for defensive use.  India also 
has thirty-eight squadrons of surface-to-air missiles.  These are of mostly Soviet design, 
and include SA-6 and SA-8 systems.112  India employs numerous radar directed 40mm 
anti-aircraft guns and man portable missiles for a last layer of defense of important 
facilities.  India is currently building an anti-tactical missile (ABM) screen, consisting of 
Russian built S-300 (SA-10) and possibly the Indian designed and manufactured Akash 
missiles.  The SA-10 has been successfully tested against Scud missiles, though the 
Akash has not demonstrated ABM capability yet.  It is not clear when these systems will 
be operational.113  These missiles are considered to be capable of destroying short-range 
tactical ballistic missiles, potentially giving India the capability to defeat a limited 
number of shorter-range ballistic missiles in the not too distant future, perhaps protecting 
key installations.114  India has shown a great deal of interest in developing a missile 
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defense, and supported the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty.  While even the best missile defense system is incapable of defeating all missile 
attacks, it can limit damage, particularly if the attack itself is limited.115   
Sufficient numbers of Pakistani aircraft or missiles could still penetrate India’s 
defenses and come into contact with India’s strategic arsenal.  India probably has no real 
concerns that they would lose their strategic nuclear capability under these circumstances.  
India’s greater strategic depth and redundancy of delivery systems serve to ensure that 
sufficient quantities of strategic systems would still survive.  Additionally, India appears 
to have a retaliatory nuclear doctrine, and such contact would probably not lead to a 
nuclear response.  Coupled with the advertised strong negative controls on nuclear 
weapons, there is little possibility of inadvertent escalation in this scenario.  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Large-scale conventional warfare between India and Pakistan has the potential to 
threaten the survival of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear forces.  However, limited Indian 
attacks, such as a retaliatory strike on the ground or through the air, would not serve as a 
real threat to the strategic weapon systems.   
The asymmetries of strategic depth and offensive military capability give India an 
advantage, and may lead to Indian large-scale conventional ground or air attack coming 
into contact with Pakistan’s strategic nuclear forces.  Pakistan’s shorter-range Hatf 3/M-
11 ballistic missiles must be stationed fairly far forward to range strategic targets in India, 
perhaps leaving them vulnerable to both air and ground attack.  The same is true of 
Pakistan’s forward airbases, which are within easy striking distance of the border.  This is 
a very troubling scenario since Pakistan places great emphasis on its strategic nuclear 
forces to deter a large-scale conventional attack by India.  The survival of Pakistan’s 
strategic forces is critical to Pakistan, and a threat to them may prompt Pakistan to launch 
a nuclear attack while the strategic forces are still intact and capable of making a credible 
impression upon India.  
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India’s greater strategic depth gives it the ability to widely disperse its strategic 
nuclear forces to areas beyond the normal range of Pakistani ground and air operations.   
Longer-range platforms, such as the SU-30 and the Agni missile series, further decrease 
Indian vulnerability.  When combined with India’s presumed retaliatory only nuclear 
doctrine, this would seem to preclude inadvertent escalation on India’s part. 
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IV. COMMAND AND CONTROL THREATENED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Can conventional warfare threaten the command and control of the strategic 
forces?  The second of Posen’s conditions considers the effects of conventional attacks 
that could degrade the adversary’s use of his nuclear forces in the time, place, and 
method of his choosing, forcing major changes in war fighting strategy.116  This could 
present a major problem if one nation depends on a limited nuclear strike to offset an 
opponent’s conventional superiority on the battlefield.  Of primary concern in this 
scenario is the loss of the capability to maintain adequate command and control of the 
nuclear weapons systems. 
There are two general types of nuclear command and control –positive and 
negative– which closely correlate to the always/never problem.  Positive control 
measures can be described as the “authorization and coordination of attack preparations 
or actual strikes,” and negative control as those measures that prevent “accidental or 
unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons.”117  Negative control can include such features 
as command disable functions, permissive action links (PAL), separation of warhead 
from the delivery system, personnel reliability program, and security functions.  Positive 
control can be thought of as those measures that ensure that the nuclear weapons work as 
intended when needed.  Included in this category are redundant command and control 
systems, the reliability of the delivery systems and nuclear weapons themselves, and 
perhaps pre-delegation of launch authority.  There tends to be an inherent trade-off 
between these factors, commonly called the always/never problem, with improvements to 
one side of the equation leading to some loss on the other side.118  There may be a 
tendency towards negative control, or “never”, during peacetime.  This may move toward 
positive, or “always”, under crisis or wartime conditions.  As with the always/never 
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problem there is tension between negative and positive control.  If there is a shift between 
negative and positive control it should be done in an orderly, prescribed manner to meet 
the changing conditions.119 
This chapter examines the structure of strategic command and control in South 
Asia.  It begins by examining what is known about the respective command and control 
structures, including personnel and communication infrastructure.  It then examines how 
conventional forces could pose a threat to command and control, using the 1990-1991 
Persian Gulf War as an example of modern targeting and attacks on command and 
control.  Both Indian and Pakistani precision targeting and attack capabilities are then 
discussed, leading to the conclusion that India has made a major investment in precision 
targeting and attack, perhaps giving it the potential to severely damage or disrupt 
Pakistani command and control, possibly even strategic command and control.   This 
could cause Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons, since the loss of command and control 
of its strategic assets would undermine its military strategy.  Pakistan has very limited 
capability to attack discreet functions such as command and control centers, leaving India 
in full control of all of its assets.  Any successful attack on Indian command, control, 
communication, computers and intelligence (C4I) probably would only serve to delay a 
counter-attack.  An alternate command and control system, where authority to use nuclear 
weapons is pre-delegated, is also examined.  This system would be more prone to failure 
and possible inadvertent use of nuclear weapons if used by either India or Pakistan. 
 
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES 
Command and control of strategic nuclear forces is an extremely important 
process.  It is the link between the national command authority, the decision makers who 
ultimately control the release of the nuclear weapons, and the personnel who have 
physical control of the weapons themselves.  Command and control has been defined as 
“an arrangement of facilities, personnel, procedures, and means of information 
acquisition, processing, and dissemination used by a commander in planning, directing, 
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and controlling military operations.”120  I use the terms command and control and C4I 
interchangeably. 
    
1. India’s Strategic Command and Control 
India’s strategic command and control is made up of several components.  The 
first component is the senior national leadership.  India first formed a National Security 
Council (NSC) following the nuclear weapons tests in November 1998.  The NSC 
consists of the prime minister and the ministers of defense, home affairs, finance, and 
external affairs.  The principal secretary to the prime minister has gained the additional 
designation of national security advisor.  The Strategic Policy Group (SPG) has twenty-
seven members and consists of the NSC plus additional cabinet ministers, the head of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, the service chiefs and intelligence chiefs, and the scientific 
advisor to the minister of defense.121  Suggestions have been made to form a national 
command post (NCP) staffed by all services.  The NCP would transmit nuclear release 
authority to a Strategic Command, who would then forward the message to the nuclear 
capable units.122 
The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) was formed to draft India’s 
nuclear doctrine after the 1998 nuclear tests.  The board was made up of twenty-two 
members from diverse backgrounds, only four of whom had military experience.  India’s 
foremost defense strategist, K. Subrahmanyam, chaired the group.123  The NSAB 
published India’s draft nuclear doctrine in 1999, and clearly outlined the basic tenets of 
command and control.  The Prime Minister, or the constitutionally designated line of 
succession, has release authority.  From here strategic command and control becomes 
murky, but the importance of ensuring the survivability of the C4I is clearly stated.124  In 
1999, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, then the head of India’s nuclear weapons programs and now 
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the president of India, gave “assurances that India has all the resources necessary to build 
an adequate command and control structure.”125 
 
Figure 4.   Suggested Nuclear Chain of Command126 
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India did not unify the military under a single command structure until the 
creation of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and an integrated military 
headquarters in 2001.127  India recently specified a long-suggested strategic nuclear 
command to control all nuclear capable forces, when the Chief of the Integrated Defense 
Staff, Lt. Gen P.C. Joshi, announced the establishment of the Strategic Nuclear 
Command (SNC).128  The first commander of the SNC may be Air Marshal T.M. 
Asthana, head of IAF Southern Command, and the headquarters may be at 
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Thiruvananthapuram.129  There also have been suggestions that these headquarters may 
ultimately be emplaced in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, a remote region far from 
Pakistan’s current strike range.  Civilian elites maintain tight control over nuclear 
weapons, which may be stored in component form, and are kept separate from the 
delivery systems.  The military controls the nuclear delivery systems.  The degree of 
integration between these two entities is unknown.130  India may be lacking critical links 
to a robust nuclear command and control structure by failing to adequately integrate the 
military into the system.131  Transporting the nuclear weapons could also be problematic 
in a crisis situation if the steps have not been adequately thought out or rehearsed.132  
Joint custody by civilian and military authorities provides stringent safeguards against 
inadvertent or unauthorized use.  However, release of nuclear weapons may be 
complicated, particularly if each service develops its own delivery systems, requiring 
multiple command and control channels.   
The associated command and control infrastructure may grow as the nuclear 
arsenal and delivery systems increase over time.  India has the resources and the 
capability to develop a command and control structure to live up to Abdul Kalam’s 
promise.  India has an advanced scientific and engineering infrastructure that includes an 
information and technology sector capable of designing and building advanced 
computers, software, and communication satellites.  India has undergone a 
communications revolution in the last decade with a rapid growth in TV, radio, 
telecommunications, and Internet use across the nation.133  This includes fiber-optic 
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cable, microwave radio relay, and a domestic satellite system with 254 earth stations.134  
The goal of this revolution is to wire the entire country together, but this goal has not 
been achieved.  India has developed the capability to design and manufacture encrypted 
communication devices and is currently emplacing a national military C4I system.135  It 
is reasonable to assume that India has, or will develop, secure and redundant strategic 
communications using a variety of methods since it has these technical capabilities.  
 India can probably be thought of as leaning towards the never side of the nuclear 
weapons never/always spectrum via stringent negative control features.  Such a policy is 
in keeping with a retaliatory posture that doesn’t need to be immediate, but that must be 
credible.  It is also consistent with a cautious, civilian dominated approach to deterrence.   
 
2. Pakistan’s Strategic Command and Control 
Pakistan has also developed a strategic command and control system made up of 
several components, and has been fairly open concerning these processes.  Pakistan 
formally announced the creation of a National Command Authority (NCA) on 2 February 
2000, following the release of India’s draft nuclear doctrine.  The head of government, 
constitutionally the prime minister but currently General Musharraf, has nuclear release 
authority.  The NCA has two committees, the first of which is the Employment Control 
Committee (ECC).  The ECC is chaired by the head of government and is made up of 
senior political, military, and scientific personnel, and would give the order to use nuclear 
weapons.  The ECC is also charged with setting the employment doctrine, and would 
meet in a crisis situation.  The second committee is the Development and Control 
Committee (DCC) has responsibility to develop nuclear weapons and their delivery 
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systems.  It is also chaired by the head of government, but consists of mostly military 
personnel and scientific advisors.136   
The military has significant input and control of all aspects of Pakistan’s strategic 
programs.  The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) has responsibility for the actual command 
and control of the strategic weapons systems.  The head of SPD is Major General Khalid 
Kidwai.  The SPD has four directorates, one of which is the C4I network itself, and 
includes representatives from all the military services.  The SPD appears to have 
responsibility for the actual security of the nuclear weapons, the delivery systems, and for 
nuclear targeting as well.  However, the exact mechanisms for these separate functions 
have not been disclosed.  The military plays a significant role at every step of the process 
from formulation of policy to actual control of the nuclear weapons.137 
 
Figure 5.   Pakistan’s Nuclear Release Authority138  
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Pakistan has not disclosed the communications channels that it uses to conduct 
strategic C4I.  Pakistan has made a significant investment in a national 
telecommunications system since 1988, although it does not have a well-developed high-
tech industry.  This includes microwave radio relay, coaxial cable, fiber-optic cables, and 
satellite links.139  Pakistan does not have an advanced information and technology sector 
capable of designing and building advanced computers or software, however, these are 
readily available on the commercial market.  It is reasonable to assume that Pakistan has, 
or will develop, secure and redundant strategic communications since the strategic 
systems are critical to the state, and since the over-all funding of these programs appear 
to have a high priority.  The strategic communications system may mirror the military 
operational communication system, or use the same infrastructure. 
Pakistan can probably be thought of as leaning heavily towards the always side of 
the nuclear weapons never/always spectrum due to its posture of deterring conventional 
aggression with nuclear weapons.140  The heavy influence of the military is also a factor 
in this assumption.  This seems appropriate when one considers Pakistan’s policy of 
nuclear first-use to deter India from making use of its conventional military advantage.  
Pakistan does have a stringent screening and control system to ensure that personnel 
involved in the nuclear weapons can be relied upon to perform their duties.141 
 
C. CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING IN A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT 
 
India and Pakistan last engaged in full-scale conventional war in 1971, prior to the 
advent of both nuclear weapons and modern precision targeting in South Asia.  The 
Kargil Crisis of 1999 remained at the limited war level, and was largely a localized 
infantry and artillery battle along the contested border in Kashmir.  No attempts were 
made to expand the scope of this conflict.  Therefore, India and Pakistan were unable to 
fully test any doctrine corresponding to the current vogue of targeting C4I with the goal 
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of depriving the senior leadership of command and control of the field forces.  There is a 
growing gap between India and Pakistan’s precision targeting and attack capabilities, 
with India having a distinct advantage.  This could lead to the targeting of C4I nodes 
during wartime, especially since this may be the most efficient manner to undermine an 
opponent’s military capability. 
 
1. Historical Examples 
 Modern war fighting methodology has placed heavy emphasis on striking the 
enemy’s C4I systems.  Doctrine developed by the United States to defeat or suppress the 
opponent’s C4I played a major role in U.S. success in Panama in 1989, the Persian Gulf 
War in 1991, and was also used in Yugoslavia in 1999.  This was made possible by 
advanced intelligence gathering capability coupled with the advent of modern precision-
strike munitions. 
 The 1991 Coalition campaign against Iraq relied heavily upon air power to 
destroy Iraq’s capability to fight.  Twelve air campaign target sets were included in the 
plan to defeat Iraq.  Two of the twelve: leadership command facilities and 
telecommunication and command, control, and communications (C3) nodes, can be 
considered to be part of C4I.  The goal was to isolate and incapacitate Iraq’s senior 
leadership and keep them from influencing the battle.142  U.S. studies after the war 
determined that it is difficult to fully understand the effects of the attacks upon enemy 
C4I.  This is partly due to the lack of metrics for measuring the effects of damage to a 
C4I system.  How much of Iraq’s C4I was disrupted was impossible to determine.  
However, there was fifty-seven percent less message traffic, indicating that there was 
some effect on these systems.143  This contrasted with a different analysis of the air war 
that depicted the tonnage of munitions dropped per month in the Gulf War as roughly 
equivalent to that of the Second World War and the Vietnam War, but was more decisive 
in the outcome.144  Conflicting analysis show the complexity of this issue, however, 
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continued emphasis and developments in this field would seem to indicate that this type 
of warfare will probably grow in emphasis over time, particularly for the well-developed 
countries. 
2. Attacking Command and Control 
 India has been steadily upgrading its ability to identify and attack discreet targets.  
Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth may make much of its C4I vulnerable.  This has taken a 
dual track approach with a move towards acquiring a robust intelligence gathering 
capability and the addition of precision weapons.  India launched its first imaging satellite 
in 1979.  These early satellites had no real intelligence gathering capability since the best 
available resolution was 1 km.  India’s capabilities have matured since then, and higher 
resolution satellites were launched beginning in the mid-1980s, and the Indian Remote 
Sensing satellites have a 5.8 meter resolution.  However, these satellites do not have 
advanced all weather or night capability, and they lack timely revisit rates.  Indian 
satellites do not have a real-time capability; meaning imagery is not immediately 
available for use.   Attempts were made to use satellite imagery in the 1999 Kashmir 
Crisis.  The systems lacked the resolution to get a clear picture of what was mostly 
infantry action, and poor weather further limited its usefulness.  However, India does 
carefully restrict dissemination of imagery of its own sensitive areas, probably indicating 
that these systems are capable of accurately depicting larger permanent facilities.145   
India has fielded unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and has used them during the 
recent crisis with Pakistan.  The Army is currently using the Searcher in the Kashmir 
region.  The Searcher is a long-endurance multi-role UAV produced in Israel and is 
capable of giving the local commander a real time picture of events on the battlefield.146  
It does not appear that India will be able to field a longer-range UAV in the near term, 
but it has developed several short-rang UAVs indigenously.147  India is also beginning to 
see a role for unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), which will give it a capability 
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to not only develop intelligence, but quickly attack as well.148  When this capability will 
be acquired is unknown.  India also has reconnaissance aircraft, like the MiG-25, capable 
of providing deep reconnaissance and intelligence.149  
India has been rapidly expanding its arsenal of precision-guided munitions.  India 
has produced several indigenously designed weapons, and acquired others on the arms 
market.  These weapons include laser-guided weapons such as the AS-30L and Kh-
29L/T, both of which are designed for attacking high value targets.  India has also 
acquired a number of anti-radar missiles, giving it the capability to suppress Pakistan air 
defenses and go after the high value targets.150  The Mirage 2000 has been equipped with 
laser designation pods, making it a true multi-role aircraft.  Two squadrons of Mirage 
2000s are currently operational, and more aircraft have been ordered to keep the units at 
full strength.151  The recently acquired and operational SU-30 is also equipped to 
perform missions in either the air superiority or ground attack mode.  The SU-30 has both 
infrared and laser targeting equipment, and can perform almost any tactical mission.152  
India has signed agreements with Russia to produce 140 SU-30 aircraft over the life of 
the contract, giving it a growing capability today and tremendous capability in the 
future.153  India’s Prithvi series of missiles have been developed to give sufficient 
accuracy to hit smaller targets.154   
India appears to be making a concerted effort to destroy high value targets, by 
making a real investment in precision-guided munitions and in the aircraft to deliver 
them.  This gives India the potential capability to alter battlefield dynamics by attacking 
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C4I nodes.  India’s increased capability to identify and attack discreet targets may give it 
the capability to damage Pakistan’s strategic C4I.  India would likely attack corps level 
assets including unit headquarters, communication infrastructure, and critical units or 
equipment.  The fact these some of these targets may be indistinguishable from, or 
overlap that of the strategic C4I, makes for a sensitive situation.  This could lead to a loss 
of command and control of strategic forces by Pakistan.  Under these circumstances the 
national command authorities might fear the loss of the ability to control the strategic 
nuclear force.  This could lead Pakistan’s leadership to give the release orders to the 
strategic forces that they are still in contact with while they can still affect some degree of 
deterrence.  This is another example of inadvertent escalation. 
Pakistan could try to attack India’s C4I with fighter-bombers and conventionally 
armed ballistic missiles.  However, it is difficult to identify and target such discrete 
command nodes, requiring both long-range intelligence gathering capability and 
precision munitions.  Pakistan has not developed any imagery satellites, and is lacking in 
long-range reconnaissance aircraft.  Pakistan has been developing and using remote 
piloted vehicles.155  The Indian army identified and shot down a number of Pakistani 
UAVs in the Kashmir region.  Pakistan is also developing the Vector UAV, which is 
advertised as having a range of 200km, and uses the global positioning system.156  
Pakistan also has identified a need for acquiring improved surveillance capability, and 
has requested the Predator UAV from the U.S. government.157 
Pakistan’s inventory of air deliverable ordnance consists of less sophisticated 
general-purpose gravity bombs and rockets.  Most of these munitions are based upon U.S. 
bomb designs and are advertised as being able to mate with laser-guided bomb kits.158  
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Pakistan probably has some modern, sophisticated air deliverable precision munitions 
capable of destroying C4I targets, but the quantities are unknown.  Pakistan’s aircraft 
may not be equipped with the necessary avionics and sighting systems to attack discrete 
targets, although many aircraft have received some type of upgrades.  Pakistan’s ballistic 
missiles have a large circular error probability (CEP), which makes them suitable for 
attacking area targets only.159  These shortages may lead to an overall inability to attack 
discreet targets to a sufficient degree necessary to cause failures in India’s C4I. 
Pakistan’s relative inability to identify and attack India’s C4I probably precludes 
any appreciable loss of command and control over India’s strategic force during a 
conventional war.  This is reinforced by a number of factors, including India’s reliance on 
negative control features, and greater strategic depth.  With India’s probable separation of 
delivery systems and warheads it is highly unlikely that any loss of control would cause 
an unauthorized launch of India’s nuclear weapons, or any real diminished discrimination 
in the use of its nuclear weapons.  However, damage to India’s strategic command and 
control system may delay the use of nuclear weapons in the retaliatory role. 
 
D. ALTERNATE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES 
Are there alternatives to the command and control structures discussed earlier in 
this chapter?  The general pronouncements made in India and Pakistan does not 
necessarily mean that survivable strategic command and control structures are in place.  
This is particularly true of India where little is known on the complete C4I structure due 
to the lack of official government statements.  The pressures of conventional combat 
could place a strain on an immature or less developed system.  During the Cold War the 
Soviet Union developed the capability to attack U.S. strategic C4I.  This caused the 
United States to enhance its early warning capability.  The United States also developed a 
more survivable C4I system, including an airborne strategic command post.  There was 
also some consideration to pre-delegating nuclear launch authority to ensure a nuclear 
response in time of crisis.160  
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Pakistan may be predisposed to pre-delegate release authority for nuclear 
weapons to ensure that the nuclear option will be available during a crisis.161  There is 
some evidence of pre-delegation to support this proposal.  Prof. Pervaiz Hoodbhoy, a 
noted anti-nuclear weapon activist, believes that release authority for Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons has been pre-delegated to subordinate commanders, possibly to corps 
commanders or even lower.  Such pre-delegation of authority may be thought necessary 
to overcome communication difficulties caused by the wide dispersal of strategic 
weapons systems to remote areas as a hedge against a pre-emptive attack by India.162  
Such a system would appear to be reasonable since Pakistan relies upon its strategic 
forces for deterrence.  If Pakistan does pre-delegate nuclear release authority, then the 
degree of command and control of Pakistan’s nuclear forces exercised by the senior 
leadership in a crisis situation might be questionable.  Inadvertent nuclear escalation 
under these circumstances could be due to the mistaken assumption that the conditions 
for using nuclear weapons had been met.  Pre-delegation of nuclear release authority has 
been strongly denied by Pakistan.163 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 Large-scale conventional warfare between India and Pakistan has the potential to 
threaten vital strategic command and control functions.  This is particularly true for 
Pakistan since India has made a major investment in intelligence gathering and precision-
strike capability.  In a military dominated system such as Pakistan’s there may also be a 
significant overlap between the normal conventional operational command and control 
structures that would be subject to attack in a large-scale war and with it the strategic 
command and control structure.  If Pakistan lost command and control of its strategic 
forces it could cause the national command authorities to order the use of its remaining 
strategic nuclear forces while they can still affect some degree of deterrence.   
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Pakistan’s inability to identify and attack India’s C4I probably precludes any 
appreciable loss of command and control over India’s strategic force during a 
conventional war.  This is reinforced by a number of factors, including India’s reliance on 
negative control features, and greater strategic depth.  A conventional attack on India’s 
command and control structures would probably only delay a retaliatory nuclear attack, 
and not lead to the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. 
There are no indications that India has pre-delegated nuclear release authority.  
However, it may find that its strategic command and control functions are unable to cope 
with the effects of a full-scale conventional war.  President Abdul Kalam’s statements 
that “nuclear command and control is mostly for deployment” might indicate that some 
steps in the process are not in place.164  Under such circumstances India’s senior 
leadership may have to cobble together a system while under pressure.  There are no 
indications that Pakistan has pre-delegated nuclear release authority.  However, it too 
may find that its strategic command and control functions are unable to cope with the 
effects of a full-scale war.  Pakistan would be under tremendous pressure to create a 
workable system if its strategic command and control system is at risk.  Pakistan’s 
reliance upon nuclear deterrence could force it to adopt pre-delegation of nuclear release 
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V. FEAR OF PRE-EMPTION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Can conventional warfare lead to the attacking forces being mistaken for a pre-
emptive attack?  Will India and Pakistan adopt a posture to guard against a pre-emptive 
strike?  A third scenario can be added to the two previously discussed scenarios.  
Inadvertent escalation can be initiated if one side loses its early warning capability.165  
However, if one side adopted a launch-on warning or launch-under-attack policy to 
defend against the perceived threat of a pre-emptive attack, then any air or ballistic 
missile attack could be considered as pre-emption, and lead to escalation 
A pre-emptive attack is a first-strike designed to destroy or neutralize strategic 
assets.  A conventional attack could be mistaken for a pre-emptive attack, and could start 
a nuclear alert cycle and cause a launch-on-warning.  Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union had nuclear forces on alert throughout much of the Cold War, and a launch-
on-warning or launch-under-attack posture at times during the Cold War.  The 
superpowers build extremely sophisticated early warning systems and a robust command 
and control infrastructure to ensure adequate warning.  Under these circumstances any 
unidentified aircraft penetrations or missile launch could have been mistaken for an 
attack or first strike.  India and Pakistan have not reached that level of technical 
sophistication.  Other factors may over-ride technical capabilities and convince one of the 
states to adopt a launch-on-warning posture.  Factors such as fear of pre-emption, and a 
lack of response time and inadequate warnings, could lead to strategic forces being 
placed in a launch-under-warning posture.   
This chapter examines how conventional air or missile attacks in South Asia 
could be mistaken for a pre-emptive strike on strategic weapon systems.  It begins by 
examining the early-warning and launch-on-warning postures of the superpowers during 
the Cold War.  This chapter then examines India and Pakistan’s ability to target and 
attack the adversary’s strategic forces with conventional weapon systems.  Next, India’s 
growing defensive capability is examined with a focus on the potential for India to deny 
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success to a weakened Pakistani nuclear second-strike.   Pakistan’s less robust defensive 
capabilities are then explored.  Finally, scenarios that consider the possibility of either 
air- or ballistic missile attacks prompting a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack are 
studied.  India’s growing precision-targeting and -strike capability may pose a threat to 
the survivability of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear assets, if not now, then in the near-term.  
Pakistan may come to fear an Indian pre-emptive attack upon its strategic nuclear assets 
due to India’s growing capabilities.  This may cause Pakistan to adopt a launch-on-
warning or launch-under-attack posture during a crisis situation.  This then could cause 
any Indian air or ballistic missile attack upon Pakistan to be mistaken for pre-emption, 
and compel Pakistan to use its nuclear forces. 
 
B. THE TOOLS OF PRE-EMPTION 
Is there a real threat of pre-emption in South Asia?  This section will explore 
whether India and Pakistan have the tools necessary for a successful pre-emptive attack, 
especially precision targeting capability and precision-attack munitions.  India and 
Pakistan are sensitive to any unknown aircraft or missiles entering its airspace due to the 
short time of flight for both aircraft and ballistic missiles, and signed an agreement in 
1991 to prevent air space violations.166  There is a risk of misinterpreting the other’s 
actions during peacetime tests, or when under aircraft or conventional ballistic missile 
attacks during times of war or crisis.167  A tenet of stable nuclear deterrence is that 
neither side can have the incentive, nor the capability to destroy the other’s nuclear forces 
on the ground.  The growing capability of precision conventional offensive weapon 
systems combined with improved intelligence gathering ability may be a threat to 
strategic weapon systems.  A robust air and missile defense could then serve to deny the 
necessary level of punishment of a weakened second-strike, effectively undermining 
deterrence.  
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1. Historical Example 
Deterrence consists of having the capability and the will to retaliate with nuclear 
weapons, and your opponent clearly recognizing that such conditions exist.168  The 
United States and the Soviet Union were aware of the advantages of striking first in the 
1950s and 1960s.169  Both the United States and the Soviet Union feared the possibility 
of pre-emptive attacks and began to build the infrastructure to ensure that they would be 
able to launch many of their strategic weapons even if under attack.  This included 
putting nuclear forces on alert throughout much of the Cold War, and adopting a launch-
on-warning or launch-under-attack posture at times of heightened tension such as during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Space based intelligence and reconnaissance satellites, radars, 
and airborne early warning systems were developed at great cost.  Each side developed a 
robust and redundant command and control infrastructure to ensure adequate first-strike 
warning.170   
The United States and Soviet Union had good reason to develop a launch-on-
warning capability.  As nuclear arsenals matured they became more accurate, and gave 
each side the potential to launch a pre-emptive strike upon the other’s strategic assets, 
especially with missiles armed with multiple warheads.  There was about a thirty minute 
warning for an ICBM attack, and as little as 15 minutes for a SLBM attack.  This caused 
both states to adopt a launch-on-warning posture.  Parts of this system were still in place 
in January 1995 when a Norwegian scientific test rocket was mistaken for a missile attack 
on Russia, almost causing Russia to launch its missiles.  Norway had notified Russia of 
the pending test, but the military personnel serving in the early-warning center did not 
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2. Precision Targeting and Attack in South Asia 
 Does India have the necessary precision targeting and precision-strike munitions 
to conduct a pre-emptive attack on Pakistan?  Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth may 
make much of its strategic nuclear assets vulnerable to attack.  India has been steadily 
upgrading its ability to identify and attack these types of targets.  This includes acquiring 
a robust intelligence gathering capability and precision-strike munitions.  India has 
imagery satellites, but these satellites do not have advanced all weather or night 
capability, lack timely revisit rates, and don’t have real-time capability.  Since India 
carefully restricts access of imagery of its own sensitive areas, this seems to indicate that 
these systems are capable of accurately depicting similar areas in Pakistan.172   
India has fielded UAVs, and has used them during the December 2001 to October 
2002 crisis with Pakistan.  The Army is currently using the Searcher, a long-endurance 
multi-role UAV produced in Israel, in the Kashmir region.  It is capable of giving the 
local commander a real-time picture of events on the battlefield.173  It does not appear 
that India will be able to field a longer-range UAV in the near term, but it has developed 
several short-range UAVs.174  India is also beginning to see a role for unmanned combat 
aerial vehicles, which will not only give it a capability to develop intelligence, but 
quickly attack as well.  However, this capability has not been acquired.175  India also has 
reconnaissance aircraft, such as the MiG-25, capable of providing deep reconnaissance 
and intelligence.176  
India has been rapidly expanding its arsenal of precision-guided munitions.  These 
weapons include laser-guided weapons and anti-radar missiles, giving it the capability to 
both suppress Pakistan air defenses and go after high value targets.177  The Mirage 2000 
has been equipped with laser designation pods, making it a true multi-role aircraft.  Two 
squadrons of Mirage 2000s are currently operational, and more aircraft have been ordered 
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to keep the units at full strength.178  The recently acquired and operational SU-30 is also 
equipped to perform missions in either the air superiority or ground attack mode.  With 
both infrared and laser targeting equipment, it can perform almost any tactical 
mission.179  India has signed agreements with Russia to produce 140 SU-30 aircraft over 
the life of the contract, giving it a growing capability today and tremendous capability in 
the future.180  India’s Prithvi series of missiles have been developed to give sufficient 
accuracy to hit smaller targets.181  India appears to be making a concerted effort to 
destroy high value targets by making a real investment in precision-guided munitions and 
in the aircraft to deliver them.  This gives India the capability to potentially damage 
some, but not all, of Pakistan’s strategic assets.  
Does Pakistan have the necessary precision targeting and precision-strike 
munitions to conduct a pre-emptive attack on India?  Pakistan could try to attack India’s 
strategic nuclear assets with fighter-bombers and conventionally armed ballistic missiles.  
This would require the ability to identify and target these assets, requiring both long-
range intelligence gathering capability and precision munitions.  Pakistan has not 
developed any imagery satellites, and is lacking in long-range reconnaissance aircraft, but 
is developing and using remote piloted vehicles.182  The Indian army identified and shot 
down a number of Pakistani UAVs in the Kashmir region.  Pakistan is also developing 
the Vector UAV, which is advertised as having a range of 200km, and uses the global 
positioning system.183  Pakistan has also identified a need for acquiring improved 
surveillance capability, and has requested the Predator from the U.S. government, but 
approval has not been granted.184   
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Pakistan’s inventory of air-deliverable ordnance consists mostly of less 
sophisticated general-purpose gravity bombs and rockets.  Many of these munitions are 
based upon U.S. bomb designs and are advertised as being able to be fitted with laser-
guided bomb kits.185 Pakistan may have some modern, sophisticated air deliverable 
precision munitions capable of destroying strategic assets, but the quantities of these 
munitions are unknown.  Pakistan’s aircraft may not be equipped with the necessary 
avionics and sighting systems to attack small discrete targets, although many aircraft 
have received some upgrades.  The current CEP of Pakistan’s ballistic missiles makes 
them unsuitable for attacking point targets, but they are probably capable of severely 
damaging area targets like airfields.186  These shortages may lead to an overall inability 
to attack small targets such as ballistic missiles or nuclear weapon storage bunkers 
necessary to destroy or neutralize India’s second-strike capability. 
 
C. EARLY WARNING AND DEFENSE POSTURE 
Both India and Pakistan have the capability to detect aircraft using ground-based 
radar. Neither state is able to detect initial missile launches, but there is a limited ability 
to track incoming ballistic missiles.  India is upgrading its air defenses, while Pakistan 
will in all likelihood lag even further behind India in this capability.  This could have a 
major impact on the possibility of pre-emptive attacks. 
 
1. India’s Air and Missile Defenses 
 India has a much more robust air defense system than Pakistan, as explained in 
Chapter 3.  India has a nation-wide advanced air defense ground environment system 
linking military and civilian radars into a coordinated network.  This multi-layered air 
defense system could probably detect a Pakistani air attack.  India’s air defense system 
would probably be adequate to direct the defense against a Pakistani attack.187  India’s 
air defenses consist of fighter aircraft, SAMs, and air defense artillery.188  India also has 
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thirty-eight squadrons of surface to air missile.  India is currently building an anti-tactical 
missile screen, made up of Russian built S-300 (SA-10 Giant) and Indian Akash missiles, 
but it is not clear when these systems will be operational.189  Indian officials admitted 
that they have not completed a system that can defeat a Pakistani missile attack.190  
However, these missiles are considered to be capable of destroying tactical ballistic 
missiles, and may give India the capability to defeat a limited number of shorter-range 
ballistic missiles.191  While this system is incapable of defeating all missile attacks it can 
limit damage if deterrence fails, particularly if the attack itself is limited.192 
 
2. Pakistan’s Air and Missile Defenses 
Pakistan has a comprehensive radar network incorporating a wide array of 
military sites and civilian air traffic control radars, also explained in Chapter 3.  Pakistan 
has a good capability to detect aircraft, but has very limited time to respond since many 
important installations are very close to the Indian border.  Pakistan’s air defense 
capabilities consist of a mixture of aircraft, SAMs, and air defense artillery.  Pakistan has 
very limited surface-to-air-missile capability, but there are large numbers of anti-aircraft 
guns, with perhaps as many as 43 regiments.193  While national coverage is less than 
adequate, sensitive facilities may have adequate defensive coverage to make them 
difficult to attack.  Pakistan does not have any type of defense against ballistic missiles 
and is unlikely to acquire them, since it deems them to be destabilizing.194  Pakistan 
requested U.S. Patriot missiles in November 2002, but is unlikely to receive them.  There 
is recognition in Pakistan that India’s growing ABM capability could erode Pakistan’s 
deterrence capability.195 
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D. CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING IN A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT  
Neither India nor Pakistan can be thought of as having well-developed early 
warning systems capable of detecting a nuclear strike under all circumstances.  However, 
both countries have pretty good radar networks capable of detecting most aircraft 
intrusions.  India is beginning to build an early warning system capable of detecting 
ballistic missiles.  The biggest difference is in defensive capabilities.  India’s layered air 
defense system is designed to prevent the attack of key installations and centers from 
aircraft, and there is a growing anti-ballistic missile capability.  Pakistan also has a 
layered air defense system, but it is more limited than India’s, forcing Pakistan to rely 
more upon survivability and an assurance of a counter-strike.  These asymmetrical 
strategic warning capabilities when combined with nuclear doctrine yields some 
interesting results in a conventional environment. 
 
1. Air Campaign 
Pakistan has the capability to detect an air attack from India, but probably could 
not stop a serious attack from reaching key installations.  Pakistan’s less developed 
defensive capabilities coupled with the greater number of Indian aircraft would seem to 
suggest that some Indian aircraft would get through, even if the qualitative superiority of 
aircraft and relative skills of pilots are totally discounted.  Pakistan’s strategic forces may 
have a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack doctrine, given its reliance upon its 
nuclear deterrent.  Pakistan may also believe that India may launch a pre-emptive strike 
to incapacitate Pakistan nuclear forces.  The combination of India’s conventional aircraft 
armed with precision-munitions and a growing air defense and anti-missile capability 
may lead Pakistan to think that India plans a pre-emptive strike.  This could mean that the 
normal give and take of aerial combat surrounding a conventional conflict could quickly 
escalate and cross the nuclear threshold.  Under these circumstances Pakistan’s national 
level command could feel it necessary to adopt a launch-on-warning or launch-under-
attack posture.  This could cause any Indian air attack to be regarded as a pre-emptive 
attack and lead to Pakistani using its nuclear weapons. 
If Pakistan were to launch an air attack on India it would probably be detected.  
India has a robust multi-layered air defense network and greater numbers of aircraft 
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available for air defense than Pakistan has to make an attack.  Indian air defenses, 
consisting of SAM and fighter aircraft, would likely render a good account of themselves.  
However, it is inevitable that some aircraft will get through, and this may have serious 
results, particularly if the aircraft are armed with nuclear weapons.  However, given 
India’s defenses, strategic depth and retaliatory nuclear doctrine, India may not feel the 
need to adopt a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack posture.  India may not 
consider a Pakistani offensive air strike to be an attempt to pre-empt, nor may it care, 
given its doctrinal retaliatory posture.  In this regard India’s capabilities appear to match 
with its draft nuclear doctrine. 
 
2. Ballistic Missile Attacks 
Pakistan could not detect an Indian ballistic missiles attack until it was too late.  
Even if it could detect the attack it does not have any missile defenses, nor are they likely 
to be developed at any time in the near future.  Pakistan may not be able to determine that 
it had been attacked with ballistic missiles until after the attack.  A ballistic missile attack 
would be a major escalation of hostilities.  The combination of India’s ballistic missiles 
armed with a low CEP and a growing air defense and anti-missile capability may lead 
Pakistan to believe that any ballistic missile attack by India was an attempted pre-emptive 
strike designed to neutralize Pakistan’s strategic nuclear weapons.  Under these 
circumstances Pakistan’s national level command could feel it necessary to adopt a 
launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack posture.  This could cause any Indian ballistic 
missile attack to be regarded as a pre-emptive attack and lead to Pakistani using its 
nuclear weapons.  
Pakistan’s ballistic missiles are the biggest threat to India.  India’s current ballistic 
missile defenses are insufficient to completely stop such an attack.  If Pakistan were to 
launch a ballistic missile attack on India it would probably be detected.  Indian ballistic 
missile defenses, consisting of the S-300 Giant and Akash SAMs, would probably be able 
to destroy some of the incoming SRBMs.  However, it is probably inevitable that some 
missiles will get through, particularly Pakistan’s longer-range Ghauri missiles that have a 
much higher re-entry velocity.  India may not feel the need to conduct a launch-on-
warning or launch-under-attack, due to its defenses, strategic depth and retaliatory 
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nuclear doctrine.  India may not consider a Pakistani ballistic missile attack to be an 
attempt to pre-empt, nor might it care, given its doctrinal retaliatory posture.  In this 
regard India’s capabilities appear to match up with its draft nuclear doctrine.   
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Large-scale conventional warfare between India and Pakistan could include air 
and ballistic missile attacks.  These attacks have the potential to be interpreted as pre-
emptive attacks to destroy or neutralize the adversary’s nuclear capability.  This is 
particularly true for Pakistan since India has made a major investment in improving its 
intelligence gathering and precision-strike capability.  India also has made a major 
investment in defensive measures, including a limited ballistic missile defense.  Pakistan 
may believe that India is trying to gain the ability to launch a pre-emptive attack and deny 
Pakistan the ability to counter with an effective second-strike with a reduced force.  This 
may lead Pakistan to adopt a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack posture where 
any Indian air- or ballistic missile attack could be interpreted as a pre-emptive strike and 
cause Pakistan to launch it’s nuclear weapons. 
Pakistan’s limited ability to identify and attack India’s strategic nuclear assets 
probably precludes any appreciable loss of India’s retaliatory capability even if Pakistan 
launched a pre-emptive attack.  This is reinforced by a number of factors, including 
India’s greater strategic depth, and superior air and ballistic missile defenses.  An air- or 
ballistic missile attack on India’s would probably elicit a strong response, but probably 
not a nuclear response. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Conventional war in South Asia could lead to inadvertent nuclear escalation.  The 
growing capabilities gap could lead to an even greater instability in the region.  The 
United States has significant interests in helping the region reach a long-term solution, 
and is the only nation positioned to positively influence both India and Pakistan.  This 
chapter concludes the thesis by citing findings, implications, and making some 
suggestions for U.S. policy to help India and Pakistan resolve their differences. 
 
A. FINDINGS 
Can India and Pakistan fight a conventional war and avoid the use of nuclear 
weapons?  The answer is maybe.  The circumstances and conditions outlined in this 
thesis show that conventional warfare between India and Pakistan could inadvertently 
escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.  Asymmetries in strategic force structure and 
doctrine, and differences in strategic depth, coupled with an aggressive conventional war 
fighting doctrine combine to make conventional warfare between India and Pakistan, 
whether limited or full-scale, a very risky proposition.  These structural factors 
undermine the concept of a stable nuclear deterrent. 
This is particularly true for Pakistan since it has not eschewed a first-strike option.  
Pakistan’s perceived vulnerability due to its lack of strategic depth and disparity in 
conventional military power compared to India has led to a dangerous situation on the 
subcontinent.  A full-scale conventional war will most likely meet one, if not all, of the 
conditions under which conventional war could inadvertently escalate to nuclear war.  
There is a strong possibility that conventional forces will put strategic forces at risk, 
damage strategic C4I, or possibly prompt a launch-on-warning/launch-under-attack due 
to fears of a pre-emptive attack.  A more limited war may reduce these risks, but could in 
turn escalate to a full-scale war where these risks are fully realized.  In short, more 




1. Survivability at Risk 
Large-scale conventional warfare between India and Pakistan has the potential to 
threaten the survival of strategic nuclear forces, particularly those of Pakistan.  The 
asymmetries of strategic depth and offensive military capability give India an advantage, 
and may lead to Indian conventional ground or air forces coming into contact with 
Pakistan’s strategic nuclear forces.  Pakistan’s shorter-range Hatf 3/M-11 ballistic missile 
must be stationed fairly far forward to range strategic targets in India, perhaps leaving 
them vulnerable to both air and ground attack.  The same is true of Pakistan’s forward 
airbases, which are within easy striking distance of the border.  This is a very troubling 
situation since Pakistan places great emphasis on its strategic nuclear forces to deter a 
large-scale conventional attack by India.  The survival of Pakistan’s strategic forces is 
critical to Pakistan, and a threat to these forces may prompt Pakistan to launch a nuclear 
attack while the strategic forces are still intact and capable of being used.  Survivability is 
less of an issue during a limited war.  However, limited war could escalate to full-scale 
war, where issues of survivability could become a major concern.  Pakistan’s de-facto 
first-use option is intended to deter Indian attack, and is indicative of Pakistan’s concerns. 
India’s greater strategic depth gives it the ability to widely disperse its strategic 
nuclear forces to areas beyond the normal range of Pakistani ground and air operations.   
Indian vulnerability is further decreased by longer-range platforms, such as the SU-30 
and the Agni missile series.  This would seem to preclude inadvertent escalation on 
India’s part when combined with India’s presumed retaliatory only nuclear doctrine. 
 
2. Command and Control Threatened 
Large-scale conventional warfare between India and Pakistan has the potential to 
threaten vital strategic command and control functions.  This is particularly true of 
Pakistan since India has made a major investment in intelligence gathering and precision-
strike capability.  There may also be a significant overlap between Pakistan’s 
conventional operational command and control structures that would be subject to attack 
in a large-scale conventional war, and the strategic command and control structure.  If 
Pakistan lost command and control of its strategic forces it could cause the national 
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command authorities to order the use the strategic nuclear forces while Pakistani 
leadership can still exercise command functions over the strategic forces.   
Pakistan’s inability to identify and attack India’s C4I probably precludes any 
appreciable loss by India of the command and control over its strategic force during a 
conventional war.  This is reinforced by a number of factors, including India’s reliance on 
negative control features, and greater strategic depth.  A conventional attack on India’s 
command and control structures would probably only delay a retaliatory nuclear attack, 
and not lead to the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. 
 
3. Fear of Pre-emption 
Large-scale conventional warfare between India and Pakistan could include air 
and ballistic missile attacks.  These attacks have the potential to be interpreted as pre-
emptive attacks to destroy or neutralize the adversary’s nuclear capability.  This is 
particularly true of Pakistan since India has made a major investment in improving its 
intelligence gathering and precision-strike capability.  India has also made a major 
investment in defensive measures, including a limited ballistic missile defense.  
Furthermore, Pakistan may believe that India is trying to gain the ability to launch a pre-
emptive attack and deny Pakistan the ability to counter with an effective second-strike 
with a reduced force.  Pakistan may feel it necessary to adopt a launch-on-warning or 
launch-under-attack posture to deter pre-emption.  Pakistan’s weaker defenses compound 
this threat, and if Pakistan adopts a launch-on-warning posture then any Indian air- or 
ballistic missile attack could be interpreted as a pre-emptive strike and cause Pakistan to 
use its nuclear weapons. 
Pakistan’s limited ability to identify and attack India’s strategic nuclear assets 
probably precludes any appreciable loss of India’s retaliatory capability even if Pakistan 
launched a pre-emptive attack.  This is reinforced by a number of factors, including 
India’s greater strategic depth, and superior air and ballistic missile defenses.  An air or 
ballistic missile attack on India’s would probably elicit a strong response, but probably 




 There are major implications to these findings.  India’s willingness to engage in a 
limited war effectively undermines the effectiveness of what has been called the stability-
instability paradox.  This increases the likelihood of conventional war in South Asia, the 
first step towards what could lead to nuclear escalation.  The current situation in South 
Asia is crisis instable, and will force changes in the way security is viewed in the region.  
Recognition of these factors will ultimately lead to changes in force structure and 
doctrine in an attempt to improve security, but may add to greater risks in the short-term 
 
1. Stability-Instability Paradox 
India believes that Pakistan uses its nuclear weapons to deter India from 
responding to aggression in Kashmir, leading to what has been termed the stability-
instability paradox.196  Nuclear weapons are supposed to provide stability by preventing 
escalation to a major war.  However, offsetting capabilities may allow an aggressor to use 
lower levels of violence (instability) in pursuit of its goals, without risk of major 
reprisal.197  The stability-instability paradox assumes that a certain level of violence is 
sustainable, and is relatively risk free.  India’s response in the 1999 Kargil Conflict and 
subsequent adoption of a limited war doctrine was designed to put an end to Pakistan’s 
alleged adventurism.198 
Indian officials, along with many deterrence optimists, expected that overt 
nuclearization following the 1998 nuclear weapons tests would ensure stability in South 
Asia.  The 1999 Kargil Conflict was an unpleasant confirmation that nuclear stability 
means different things to different people.  India and Pakistan completely mobilized 
military forces beginning in December 2001, and did not de-mobilize until October 2002.  
During this period a war of words ensued that included a series of threats that included 
nuclear threats.  India was poised on the brink of war, and many thought that some sort of 
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military attack would soon follow.  India’s willingness to take steps to “punish” Pakistan 
for its alleged support of terrorism could effectively undermine the stability-instability 
paradox.  However, since India did not follow up its words with military actions there 
may be those that believe that the stability-instability paradox is still a usable doctrine. 
 
2. Crisis Instability in South Asia 
Crisis instability is the opposite of crisis stability.  It is based upon the fear of a 
surprise attack that threatens the nuclear deterrent, and undermines a stable nuclear 
deterrence.199  A number of factors are at play in a crisis unstable environment, the most 
critical being the absence of one or more tenets of a stable nuclear deterrence.  These 
tenets are: reliable nuclear weapons, secure second-strike capability, no possibility of pre-
emption, and weapons are secure against unauthorized use.  India and Pakistan do not 
appear to have fully developed the middle two tenets of a stable nuclear deterrence as 
discussed earlier.  While both sides have tried to develop a secure second-strike 
capability, they may not be as survivable as required in light of the growing intelligence 
gathering and precision-strike capability.  Pakistan in particular is handicapped by its lack 
of strategic depth and by India’s growing capabilities.  This leads to a growing concern 
that India may develop the capability to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear capability in a pre-
emptive attack, or at least the perception by Pakistan that it is attempting to gain a pre-
emptive capacity.   
Preparing for the possibility of being a victim of a first-strike, i.e. increasing 
readiness levels of strategic weapons, increasing alert posture, etc., can also be mistaken 
as preparing to launch a first-strike.200  The classical security dilemma comes into play, 
making any steps taken by a state to increase its security to be interpreted as an attempt to 
undermine the security of other states.201  Crisis stability can build a great deal of 
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confidence that neither side will attempt to engage in nuclear warfare, while crisis 
instability provides the opposite effect. 
Posen excluded the “occasional accidental conventional attacks on nuclear 
weapons” systems as part of the friction of war as well as the “deliberate and sustained 
attack on nuclear weapons” systems that were designed to alter the balance of forces as 
being deliberately provocative.202  There is a tremendous difference between incidental 
attacks and deliberate sustained attacks.  The occasional attack, while potentially 
damaging, should not change the strategic picture.  However, a well-coordinated 
conventional attack using good intelligence and precision-guided weapons has the 
potential to undermine the strategic forces of the targeted country.  Such an attack has the 
potential to change the strategic balance, and would therefore add a totally different 
dynamic to any conflict.  Recognition of crisis instability in South Asia will lead India 
and Pakistan to take steps to ensure the security of their strategic forces. 
 
3. Future Changes in Force Structure and Doctrine 
All three scenarios discussed in this thesis give rise to the potential for both 
deliberate and inadvertent escalation.  Deliberately escalating and crossing the nuclear 
threshold is a profound yet deliberate choice.  However, inadvertent escalation, while just 
as profound, can be an unforeseen consequence of the opponent’s actions.  Studying the 
three situations yields a number of elements that are destabilizing, and perhaps 
preventable.  Small arsenals lead to a degree of vulnerability, command and control is 
vulnerable, and pre-emption may become a real possibility.  Each situation has a possible 
short-term solution in terms of force structure and nuclear doctrine that increases the 
likelihood of nuclear war.  These are an arms race, pre-delegation of nuclear release 
authority, or a launch-on-warning posture. 
Will India and Pakistan engage in an arms race with a goal of building up their 
respective strategic arsenals to provide a hedge against vulnerability?  Both states are 
currently expanding and modernizing their strategic forces, especially the delivery 
systems.  Pakistan will be under greater pressure to strengthen its strategic arsenal as the 
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conventional balance continues to tilt in India’s favor.  India may feel the need to expand 
its strategic arsenal to meet its goal of being a major regional power. The history of tit-
for-tat actions in South Asia seems to indicate that these actions will spiral upwards in an 
arms race of sorts, but not at superpower levels due to economic considerations.   Both 
states may feel the need to resume nuclear weapons testing to reinforce perceptions of 
strength and resolve.  An arms race in South Asia would be particularly de-stabilizing to 
Pakistan due to its already weak economy. 
What will Pakistan do to ensure the effectiveness and safety of strategic command 
and control structures?  Pakistan’s nuclear release authority is centered on a small cadre 
of decision makers who may be more vulnerable than the strategic command and control 
structure itself.  The only quick fix to threats to the current command and control 
structure, either physical infrastructure or personnel related, would be to pre-delegate 
launch authority to subordinate commanders.  This strategy would ensure that if 
Pakistan’s “red-lines” were crossed that the launching of nuclear weapons would surely 
follow, and thus could serve as an effective deterrent.  This would increase the risks of 
inadvertent escalation, not diminish it.  Building a robust and redundant strategic 
command and control infrastructure is the only practical long-term solution, but may be 
out of Pakistan’s reach in the short-term.   
Will Pakistan adopt a launch-on-warning posture to guard against pre-emption?  
India’s growing advanced conventional capabilities; based upon increased intelligence 
gathering and targeting capability and precision munitions, may hold Pakistan’s small 
strategic forces at risk.  India’s defensive capabilities against air and ballistic missile 
attack will continue to grow.  Pakistan’s fears of a pre-emptive or decapitating first strike 
may grow as well, even though India’s defense systems cannot provide a complete 
defense.  Pakistan must therefore factor any conventional air attack, or perhaps ballistic 
missile launch, as a possible strike upon its retaliatory capability.  Pakistan may feel that 
its only recourse is to adopt a launch-on-warning posture to guard against pre-emption.  




C. U.S. POLICY  
India and Pakistan’s relations continued to deteriorate following the terrorist 
attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001.  Forces were mobilized along the 
border, leading to a tense military standoff.  Intense pressure was put on the Indian 
government to conduct retaliatory attacks against Pakistan.  The situation only began to 
de-escalate following the direct intervention of the United States and other concerned 
nations.  Forces were finally withdrawn from the border in October 2002.  The crisis was 
only the most recent of a number of such crises between India and Pakistan that have had 
the potential to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.  As dangerous and as devastating 
as the deliberate use of nuclear weapons would be, of even greater concern is that 
asymmetries of doctrine, conventional and strategic forces, and command and control 
could lead to inadvertent nuclear escalation. 
 
1. U.S. Security Concerns 
Inadvertent nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan threatens several U.S. 
security interests.  Escalation between India and Pakistan would be devastating not only 
to Indians and Pakistanis but also to U.S. efforts to stabilize the region after the war in 
Afghanistan.  The 1998 nuclear weapons tests were a blow to global nuclear 
nonproliferation efforts; the use of nuclear weapons would further undermine the 
nonproliferation regimes.  The use of nuclear weapons as a warfighting tool ultimately 
could serve as an incentive for other nations, particularly those that are already pariah 
states, to continue to develop nuclear weapons.  This would be a direct threat to U.S. 
interests, and significantly complicate U.S. efforts to deter regional aggression, WMD 
use, and even terrorism.  The casualties caused by a major nuclear exchange would be a 
humanitarian, economic, and ecological disaster. 
 
2. U.S. Role in South Asia 
The U.S. military can help reduce tensions in the region by providing an 
environment that fosters cooperation and reduces the threat of inadvertent escalation.  
The rapidly improving U.S.-India defense relationship and Pakistan’s assistance in the 
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U.S. war effort provide an opportunity to convey U.S. concerns.  The United State’s 
influence with each country’s political and defense establishment has improved 
considerably in recent years, providing some leverage in the region.  The U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) can play an important role in managing crises should they 
arise.  Three mutually supporting engagement roles are proposed for consideration.  
These engagement roles are focused on measures to keep the peace, maintain the military 
balance, and moving the peace process forward. 
The single most important step to preventing nuclear war in South Asia is to keep 
the peace between India and Pakistan.  The U.S. should take concrete steps to encourage 
Indian restraint in Kashmir and to pursue a political process in Indian-held Kashmir.  The 
U.S. should caution Pakistan against supporting militants in Kashmir and encourage 
Pakistan to accept a political process there.  Both India and Pakistan should be 
encouraged to reduce tensions, particularly in Kashmir.  Encourage India and Pakistan to 
resolve other outstanding differences (water rights, economic zones of interest, etc.).  The 
United States could help India and Pakistan negotiate bilateral arrangements for the 
disputed border areas that include information sharing, joint patrolling, and hot pursuit.   
Maintaining the regional balance is imperative.  The United States should help 
stabilize conventional and nuclear deterrence in the region.  Cooperative threat reduction 
has been successful in reducing the over-all threat of nuclear war; the program should be 
extended to include India and Pakistan, taking into account the unique characteristics of 
the respective programs.  The U.S. can help ensure that nuclear weapons are secure 
against unauthorized use by providing technical training and assistance on security issues 
and negative control measures.  Technical training and assistance to ensure robust and 
redundant C4I are emplaced for strategic weapons systems could also be provided.  A 
hotline between the respective heads of state to ensure direct communication in times of 
crisis should be emplaced.  The U.S. should take steps to ensure that de-stabilizing 
weapons systems (ABM, first-strike weapons, etc.) are not introduced into the region, and 
if they are, take steps to ensure that some degree of parity is maintained.  Steps should be 
taken to ensure that Pakistan has adequate conventional defensive armaments, primarily 
focused on air defenses, so that it can move away from over-reliance on nuclear 
deterrence. 
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Finally, the United States should take steps to move the processes forward so that 
a permanent peace could be established in South Asia.  The United States should help 
develop a regional security cooperation strategy through the development of a “South 
Asia” engagement strategy to promote regional stability, provide direction to the rapidly 
evolving U.S.-India and U.S.-Pakistan defense relationship, and ultimately lead to Indo-
Pakistani cooperation.  Both states are important to the United States geopolitically, (as 
partners in dealing with China, Central Asia, or the Persian Gulf), militarily, (combating 
terrorism and in keeping regional sea lines of communication (SLOCs) open), while India 
is important economically (for trade and investment), and politically (as the world’s 
largest democracy).   This strategy should include three elements.  First, the United States 
should pursue a long-term security relationship with both India and Pakistan, and 
recognize that security cooperation with both is critical to regional stability.  Second, the 
United States must make both India and Pakistan aware that they have a joint 
responsibility to ensure peace in South Asia, and emphasize war prevention in this 
strategy.  Finally, the United States should help forge a common understanding between 
the two states on regional security issues and begin taking constructive steps towards 
cooperation.    
The United States should accelerate U.S.-India and U.S.-Pakistan military training 
and exercises.  One method is to continue to promote counter-terrorism training and 
cooperation, which is equally important to all parties.  U.S.-India and U.S.-Pakistan 
military exercises that demonstrate the risks and futility of escalation could be conducted.  
Efforts should be made toward conducting a U.S.-India, and U.S.-Pakistan naval exercise 
in defending SLOC access.  The United States should make an effort to promote military 
interoperability in the event of a military contingency in the Persian Gulf or Central Asia. 
The United States should seek to establish close personal ties with defense 
officials.  The new climate of cooperation enables U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
officials and uniformed personnel to develop closer working relationships with their 
Indian and Pakistani counterparts after years of misunderstanding and mistrust between 
the respective militaries.  Routine talking points should include:  Encourage Indian 
restraint in Kashmir to pursue a political process in Indian-held Kashmir.  Caution 
Pakistan against supporting militants in Kashmir and encourage them to accept a political 
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process there.  Encourage India and Pakistan to reduce tensions, particularly in Kashmir. 
Encourage India and Pakistan to resolve other outstanding differences (water rights, 
economic zones of interest, etc.).  The goal should be to try to develop a common 
strategic understanding with counterparts on South Asia, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, 
and China.  Major emphasis should be made of the value that the U.S. places on good 
relations with both India and Pakistan, and on reducing regional tensions. 
Another area with potential is the promotion of professional military education 
and exchanges.  This will pay huge dividends in the long term as more Indians and 
Pakistanis understand our political and military systems and more Americans understand 
theirs. The United States should try to develop a common strategic understanding with 
counterparts on South Asia, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and China.  Opportunities for 
India and Pakistani military officers and defense officials to attend the Asia-Pacific 
Center for Security Studies (APCSS) or universities such as the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) could be offered.  An exchange program with Indian and Pakistani military 
officers attending U.S. professional military education institutions such as Command and 
General Staff College and the War College and sending U.S. officers to service 
equivalents in India and Pakistan could be established.  Also, in-country training sites in 
all three states could be established so officers can become familiar with language, 
customs, and culture so that they can facilitate increased military to military contact. 
 
D. FINAL WORDS 
India and Pakistan must find ways to solve their problems.  Each side must realize 
that the nuclearization of South Asia has raised the stakes and that any conflict has the 
potential to lead to nuclear war.  The risk of conventional war in South Asia is high, and 
so is the risk of inadvertent escalation to nuclear war.  Steps must be taken to ensure that 
India and Pakistan do not become embroiled in a war, even if the military actions are 
limited.  The United States can play a constructive role in the region by taking steps to 





































LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ABM  Anti-Ballistic Missile 
APCSS Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 
ATV  Advanced Technology Vehicle 
CEP  Circular Error Probability 
COAS  Chief of Army Staff 
COSC  Chiefs of Staff Committee 
C3   Command, Control, and Communications 
C4I  Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence 
DCC  Development and Control Committee 
DoD  Department of Defense 
ECC  Employment Control Committee 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HEU  Highly Enriched Uranium 
IAF  Indian Air Force 
ICBM  Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
ISR  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
kt   Kiloton 
LOC  Line of Control 
MRBM Medium-range Ballistic Missile 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NCP  National Command Post 
NSAB  National Security Advisory Board 
NPS  Naval Postgraduate School 
NSC  National Security Council 
RAPID Reinforced Army Plains Division 
PAF  Pakistan Air Force 
PAL  Permissive Action Link 
SAM  Surface-to-air missile 
SLBM  Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 
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SLOC   Sea Lines of Communication 
SNC  Strategic Nuclear Command 
SPD  Strategic Plans Division 
SRBM  Short-range Ballistic Missile 
TEL  Transporter Erector Launcher 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
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